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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
After two long years collecting hundreds of gigabytes of e-mail,
data base reports, and social media posts from countries in Europe, Asia,
and South America, such as France, South Korea, Argentina, Canada,
Australia, and El Salvador, the day of trial has arrived. The trial team has
obtained the data at great cost, in dollars as well as person-hours, but is
finally ready for trial. First-chair counsel, second-chair counsel, and four
paralegals file into the courtroom, not with bankers boxes full of
documents as in earlier times, but with laptops, tablet computers, and a
data projector. Following opening statements, the first witness takes the
stand. After a few questions about the existence of e-mails written by
executives of the defendant multinational corporation, a paralegal moves
to the projector, as she rehearsed many times, to flip on the switch that
will project the e-mails for the jury. She hears, “Objection!” followed
immediately by, “Sustained.” Counsel asks for a sidebar. Instead, the
judge asks the court officer to take the jury out. She then notes that these
e-mails, the production of which she had ruled upon previously, were
created outside the U.S. Who will testify to their authenticity? What was
the chain of custody—were they altered in some fashion in the office or
between the client’s servers and counsel’s laptop? How, exactly, do the
e-mails fit into an exception to the hearsay rule? Business records? What
is the “business” of this foreign facility that requires the use of e-mail on a
regular basis? Counsel asks for a continuance to respond to those
questions. “Denied!” the judge says.
[2]
The above cautionary tale describes the next logical step to the
cross-border discovery wars that have raged on over the last several
years.1 Studies have shown that over ninety percent of all business
1

See generally SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. SIX, FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
OF CROSS-BORDER DISCOVERY CONFLICTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE
COMPETING CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY AND DISCOVERY 14-16
(2008) [hereinafter SEDONA FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.thesedona
conference.org/dltForm?did=WG6_Cross_Border.
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correspondence exists in digital form.2 The pace of global commerce is
accelerating, and thus, increasing amounts of documentary evidence
needed for U.S. litigation, arbitration, and regulatory proceedings comes
from outside the United States.3 While the law continues to evolve with
regard to discovery and disclosure of protected data across borders, it is in
a state of relative infancy with regard to admissibility of that information.
Furthermore, it would be a disappointing and expensive endeavor indeed
if hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees were spent to gather and
produce discoverable discovery of electronic evidence that is ultimately
excluded at trial.4
[3]
This article will discuss the parameters for the admissibility of
electronic information from outside the U.S. in the context of trials as well
as motions that require the support of proof in admissible form. It will
provide guidance to the practitioner and the court on the admissibility of
various types of electronically stored information (“ESI”) that have been
created, or are maintained, outside the borders of the United States.
Section II will comprise a review of the rules for admission of evidence in
U.S. Courts and their application to electronic evidence obtained abroad at
various stages of the litigation lifecycle. Section III will discuss
challenges to the use of non-U.S. ESI arising from conduct during pretrial
2

See MARY MADDEN & SYDNEY JONES, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
NETWORKED WORKERS at ii (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.
org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Networked_Workers_FINAL.pdf.pdf; Maria Perez
Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic
Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2006).
3

See Marissa L. P. Caylor, Modernizing the Hague Evidence Convention: A Proposed
Solution to Cross-Border Discovery Conflicts During Civil and Commercial Litigation,
28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 342 (2010); Okezie Chukwumerije, International Judicial
Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 649, 650 (2005).
4

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007). See
generally Paul W. Grimm et al. Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American
Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored
Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 358-61 (2009).
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discovery. Section IV will analyze the admissibility of non-U.S. ESI in
motion practice. Section V will address authentication of specific
categories of ESI encountered in cross-border matters such as e-mails,
instant messages and chat logs, social media sites, Internet tracking
information, and printouts of the same.
II.

FOUNDATION FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION

[4]
The rules of evidence apply equally to evidence offered in
electronic format and on paper.5 If anything, the rules may apply greater
scrutiny to ESI because of concerns about the reliability of electronic
evidence. As Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm wrote in Lorraine v.
Markel Insurance Co., “Computerized data . . . raise[s] unique issues
concerning [its] accuracy and authenticity.”6 Judge Grimm is not alone in
his cautious approach to electronic evidence. In New York v. Microsoft
Corp., the court posited a fundamental evidentiary inquiry about e-mail,
namely, how can one establish that e-mail is what it purports to be.7
Similarly, Judge Grimm noted in Lorraine that whether the offered ESI is
a chart entry, business record, or other form of proof, counsel must
establish origins and chain of custody.8
5

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538; Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh M. Murray, The
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 5, ¶ 2 (2010).
6

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 557 n.34.

7

See New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233 (CKK), 2002 WL 649951, at *1
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002). See generally FED. R. EVID. 901 (identifying methods of
authentication).
8

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534 at 548. Maintenance of an unbroken chain of custody cannot
be stressed enough as a best-practice, although a kink in the chain of custody does not
necessarily prevent the admissibility of a piece of evidence. See United States v.
Campbell, No. 94-30295, 1996 WL 241545, at *5-6 (9th Cir. May 9, 1996). An audio
recording was admitted into evidence based on testimonial evidence regarding
characteristics of the defendant’s voice, the content of the recording, and evidence that

4
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[5]
These rules for evidence have long existed in the world of paper;
however, since paper evidence is commonplace, it often does not require a
searching inquiry.9 Courts assess electronic evidence with greater caution
due in part to the fact that courts have far less experience with electronic
evidence than with paper.10 Some judges are unfamiliar with technology,
and counsel before them may not have assiduously educated the court on
the integrity of the proffered evidence.11 Non-U.S. evidence presents
additional levels of complication. In the country of data creation, what
security safeguards exist that can provide indicia of authenticity and
reliability? Do the indicia require live testimony or declarations, or are
there technological markers and distinctive characteristics that can indicate
trustworthiness and reliability? If the data is offered through the business
record exception to the hearsay rule, how does one prove the required
regularity of business record-keeping practices in, for example, China,
where such practices vary sharply from the U.S.? Are there conflicts of
law issues regarding privacy and security of data that impact
tape was not altered, despite a break in chain-of-custody when a recording was made of
the tape. Id. The Court went on to say that “[A] defect in the chain of custody goes to
the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence introduced." Id. (citing United States v.
Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1995)). Proof of an unbroken chain of
custody, especially with evidence travelling from outside the U.S., will help bolster
authenticity and address any claims that foreign ESI has been compromised during its
journey to the courtroom. See PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE
258-59 (2005).
9

See Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).

10

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537; SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. ONE,
COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 2 (2008). However, “when more
judges will have been raised on computers, the suspicion in several judicial quarters
surrounding the creation and potential alteration of ESI may diminish, and the
requirements for admissibility may be less demanding.” Sheldon M. Finkelstein &
Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information: It's Still the Same
Old Story, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 45, 46 (2010).
11

See Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 63
(2009).
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discoverability? If so, is the party that has asserted those laws as an
objection to discoverability then precluded from offering similar evidence
at trial? Finally, what are the standards for proof of the foreign laws and
even for resolution of conflicts over language translation?
[6]
The rules that govern the admission of documentary evidence
require the satisfaction of six criteria:
Relevance; Authenticity;
Reliability; Non-Hearsay (or coverage under a hearsay exception); Best
Evidence/Original Evidence Rule; and Probative Value vs. Prejudicial
Effect.12 These criteria are frequently interrelated; establishment of one
requirement may satisfy one or more of the others.13 In addition, a method
exists by which the court may admit foreign ESI through the expediency
of the Self-Authenticating Document Rules, which relieve the proponent
of the need to obtain extrinsic evidence such as live testimony,
declarations, or certifications.14
Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”)
401 admits only that ESI which has a tendency to make some
consequential fact to the litigation more or less probable than it would
otherwise be.15 Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.16

12

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538.

13

See United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 499 (2d Cir. 1984); Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at
539; Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence
to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 147, 156 (2010) (suggesting that authenticity is often a subset of
relevance: “if evidence is not authentic, it has no relevance to the case”).
14

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551; Grimm et. al., supra note 4, at 384; Randy Wilson,
Admissibility of Web-Based Data, 52 THE ADVOC. (TEX.) 31, 31-32 (2010).
15

FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .”).
16

FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”).
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Authenticity

[7]
If evidence meets the threshold standard for relevance, it must be
shown to be authentic.17 Authenticity, put simply, requires proof that the
item is, in fact, what it purports to be.18 The court will ask if the item of
information is what counsel says it is. For example, for a company e-mail,
text message, database report, website, or social media posting from the
source the proponent claims, most often the author, an entity can
demonstrate the item’s authenticity. Evaluating the requirements needed
to satisfy the authenticity hurdle is more complex in the world of
electronic evidence. The Ninth Circuit held in In re Vinhee that “[t]he
paperless electronic record involves a difference in the format of the
record that presents more complicated variations on the authentication
problem than for paper records.”19 Yet, the court noted, “(u)ltimately. . . it
all boils down to the same question of assurance that the record is what it
purports to be.”20 The complexity is found in the provision of such
“assurance.” In In re Vee Vinhnee, American Express sought to introduce
certain electronic account records, but failed to detail the protocols for the
computer systems holding those records and the basis of American
Express’ assertions that it had preserved the integrity of the data.21 In
sustaining the trial court’s decision, the Circuit court upbraided counsel
for assumptions that led to perceived shortcomings in its offer of proof,
and, in so doing, provided guidance on laying a proper foundation for ESI:

17

FED. R. EVID. 901(a) requires that evidence be authenticated.
accomplished in myriad ways. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b).

18

This may be

See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(a).

19

Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437,
445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
20

Id.

21

See id. at 442.
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The logical questions extend beyond the identification of
the particular computer equipment and programs used. The
entity's policies and procedures for the use of the
equipment, database, and programs are important. How
access to the pertinent database is controlled and,
separately, how access to the specific program is controlled
are important questions. How changes in the database are
logged or recorded, as well as the structure and
implementation of backup systems and audit procedures for
assuring the continuing integrity of the database, are
pertinent to the question of whether records have been
changed since their creation. There is little mystery to this.
All of these questions are recognizable as analogous to
similar questions that may be asked regarding paper files:
policy and procedure for access and for making corrections,
as well as the risk of tampering. But the increasing
complexity of ever-developing computer technology
necessitates more precise focus.22
[8]
As shown by the In re Vee Vinhnee opinion, courts unfamiliar with
technology, and even those more sophisticated in the area, may require
offers of proof, documents, and hearings to establish that the information
being offered as authentic is what counsel says it is.23 Counsel must
ascertain whose policies and procedures govern the creation of the
information and determine how to get that person or entity before the
court. Courts have been increasingly vigilant about the foundation for
ESI, “demanding that proponents of evidence obtained from electronically
stored information pay more attention to the foundational requirements
than has been customary for introducing evidence not produced from
22

Id. at 445.

23

See generally Cooper Offenbecher, Admitting Computer Record Evidence after In Re
Vinhnee: A Stricter Standard for the Future?, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2007)
(examining the numerous foundation standards that courts have applied to the
authentication of electronic records).

8
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electronic sources.”24
Foundational requirements are particularly
important for ESI produced from systems and applications in countries
whose information governance protocols may be unfamiliar to U.S.
judges, and “[t]he required foundation will vary not only with the
particular circumstances but also with the individual judge.”25 However, it
is instructive, as Magistrate Judge Grimm observed in Lorraine, that “the
inability to get evidence admitted because of a failure to authenticate it
almost always is a self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful
advance preparation.”26
[9]
Authenticity and its corollary reliability may be established by an
entity’s information management protocols, the policies, procedures and
practices that govern the creation, storage, and transmission of non-U.S.
ESI. Moreover, these same protocols will be used by courts in
establishing whether ESI satisfies the business records exception to
hearsay.27 Often courts use the same analysis to determine whether
electronic information qualifies for the business records exception to the
hearsay rule.28 In other words, the practices of the company in the
creation and maintenance of its business information may indicate to a
court that the information has the necessary safeguards for the finder of
fact to rely upon it.29 But what if the loci of creation, storage, and
transmission are outside the U.S.?
24

Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 543 (D. Md. 2007).

25

See id. at 544.

26

Id. at 542.

27

See FED. R. EVID. 902(11); Frieden & Murray, supra note 5, ¶¶ 33-35

28

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); Frieden & Murray, supra note 5, ¶33 (“This method mirrors
the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule; therefore, courts
often analyze it in conjunction with that exception.”).

29

See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R.
437, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).

9
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[10] What if the information crosses several countries? It is not
uncommon for employees of multinational corporations to create business
documents from laptops, tablets, and smartphones while travelling among
multiple countries.30 A company network housed with a cloud provider
may store this information on servers in still more countries and back it up
at corporate headquarters in yet another on-site repository.31 A U.S. court,
in exploring the basis for admission of that information, may well ask for
proof of routinized practices governing the “life” of that information to be
assured of its integrity, and to satisfy the criteria for the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.32
[11] Frequently, information governance protocols for organizations
located outside the U.S. use a language other than English and are drafted
30

See SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. SIX, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON
DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE & DATA PROTECTION: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION & DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED DATA IN
U.S. LITIGATION at v (E.U. ed. Dec. 2011), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.
org/dltForm?did=IntlPrinciples2011.pdf (“This unprecedented explosion in information
owes in large part to ubiquitous, mobile, and easily-replicatable nature of ESI. Today, an
employee from a Toronto company can conduct business from a cafe [sic] in Paris, while
sending electronic messages to customers in Dubai that attach documents from “cloud”
servers located in Singapore, Dallas, and Amsterdam.”).
31

See Alberto G. Araiza, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
8, ¶7 (“Cloud providers essentially virtualize the same physical resources (such as
processors and storage arrays) to service multiple dispersed clients. Cloud providers also
divide ‘the tasks of running applications and storing data into small chunks,’ and then
allocate the chunks among various distributed resources.” (citation omitted)).
32

See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 445 (“The logical questions extend beyond the
identification of the particular computer equipment and programs used. The entity’s
policies and procedures for the use of the equipment, database, and programs are
important. How access to the pertinent database is controlled and, separately, how access
to the specific program is controlled are important questions. How changes in the
database are logged or recorded, as well as the structure and implementation of backup
systems and audit procedures for assuring the continuing integrity of the database, are
pertinent to the question of whether records have been changed since their creation.”).
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and enforced pursuant to the laws of the foreign country in question.33
While foreign laws governing the security of certain protected data may
help establish reliability, parties may dispute the scope and applicability of
those laws. Preparation, though, can ease the pain, especially with regard
to authentication of non-U.S. ESI.34
[12] The evidentiary solution for the admission of foreign ESI may
sound daunting, but as the singer Paul Simon wrote, “The answer is easy if
you take it logically . . . .”35 Counsel can achieve that logical solution by
taking a step-by-step approach through each of the six foundational
requirements and documenting the support for each element. Such
support can take the form of pegging the various foundational
requirements to support answers found in the entity’s information
management procedures and laws of the countries involved in the
information creation, maintenance, and transmission. The journey has a
few shortcuts. Just as procedures for information governance intertwine
security and privacy, the evidentiary components do not reside in silos.36
Satisfaction of one rule may provide the answer to questions posed by
another.
B.

Reliability

[13] After authenticity, the next hurdle to clear for a proponent of
foreign ESI is reliability. Reliability exists as an often overlooked, but
33

See infra note 63 and accompanying text.

34

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542 (D. Md. 2007).

35

PAUL SIMON, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
(Columbia Records 1975).

36

See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C § 6801 (2006) (requiring financial
institutions to follow procedures to safeguard the privacy of customer information);
DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004) (analyzing the
admissibility of e-mails under Rules 902(11) and 803(6), and explaining that the analyses
of authentication and hearsay are intertwined).
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critical, subset of authenticity.37 The Manual for Complex Litigation
instructs that courts should “consider the accuracy and reliability of
computerized evidence” and the “proponent of computerized evidence has
the burden of laying a proper foundation by establishing its accuracy.”38
[14] In the United States, reliability can be shown by reference to
procedures for transferring ESI, such as documentation showing the
policies and security controls for maintaining the integrity of information
in storage and in motion—i.e., logged in and out at the recipient’s
repository—to establish a chain of custody.39 Metadata and unique
characteristics inherent in a piece of electronic information (i.e. a hash
value) may demonstrate that parties have not altered data.40 Statutory or
regulatory compliance may also indicate reliability.41 Showing that these
provisions were followed can help meet the requirement of proof that the
proffered evidence remains unaltered and, thus, is reliable (although, of
course, this showing is more easily made with documented policies and
procedures for sending, receiving, and storing the information in a secure

37

See Connecticut v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 942-43 (Conn. 2004) (“In addition to the
reliability of the evidence itself, what must be established is the reliability of the
procedures involved . . . .”).
38

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).

39

See generally Christy Burke, Examining E-Discovery Chain of Custody, LAW.COM
(Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?
id=900005494089 (explaining the importance of logging the chain of custody of ESI).

40

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546-48 (D. Md. 2007)
(explaining that the use of hash values and the examination of metadata can be used as
methods of authenticating electronic evidence).
41

See, e.g., Steve Apiki, Sarbanes-Oxley: Driving the Storage Compliance Boom,
ENTERPRISESTORAGEFORUM.COM (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.enterprisestorageforum.
com/continuity/features/article.php/3485651 (explaining that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires that data integrity be maintained over a retention period, which can serve to help
in the authentication of stored documents by ensuring they are original).

12
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fashion).42
[15] Similarly, data protection statutes, which mandate safeguards for
data sent beyond a country’s borders, can assist counsel in establishing
data integrity.43 For example, regulations drafted under Israel’s Protection
of Privacy Act pertaining to personal data in databases protect that
information by requiring that the recipient of the database information
safeguard it as though it were located in Israel.44 Israel’s Protection of
Privacy Act comprises very specific requirements to control entry of data,
access to data, and transfers of data from those databases.45 Argentina’s
Personal Data Protection Act and regulations promulgated thereunder also
provide stringent provisions for the security of personal data in databases
and prohibit the transfer of such information unless the recipient can
provide similar safeguards.46 Thus, a showing by the proponent of such
evidence of regulatory and statutory requirements preserving the integrity
of the data, along with testimony or a certification that the regulations and
statutes as pertinent were followed, can satisfy the foundational burden of
reliability.47 The proponents and opponents of such evidence, then, should
42

See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 545 (“It is necessary, however, that the authenticating
witness provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored
information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change
or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so . . .
.”).
43

E.g. Privacy Protection (Transfer of Databases Abroad) Regulations, 2001, KT 5761,
1-2 (Isr.).
44

Id.

45

Protection of Privacy Law 5741-1981, SH No. 196 p. Chapter 2, Article 1 (Isr.) (such
as forbidding possession of a database without registration, and even forbidding use of a
database “except for the purposes for which the data base was set up.”).
46

Law No. 25326, Oct. 4, 2000, A.D.L.A. 5426 (Arg.); Decree No. 1558, Dec. 3, 2001,
XXIX A.D.L.A. 1558 (Arg.).
47
See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 545; MANUAL
11.446 (2004).

13
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familiarize themselves with the applicable non-U.S. data protection
provisions.
C.

Hearsay

[16] The criterion that evidence is not hearsay, or falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule, requires the court first to determine whether
the computerized information in question is indeed hearsay. Hearsay is:
(1) an assertive statement; (2) made by a human declarant; (3) offered for
the truth of the matter asserted; and (4) not excluded from the definition of
hearsay because it is: (a) an opposing party’s statement as understood by
F.R.E. 801(d)(2); or (b) a prior testimonial statement covered by F.R.E.
801(d)(1).48 If ESI constitutes hearsay, it is inadmissible unless it falls
within one of the recognized exceptions to hearsay statements.49
[17] Insofar as ESI is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
all ESI is hearsay, provided the data offered is a statement of a declarant
and not machine-generated, such as a computerized readout.50 The
exception to the hearsay rule most commonly applicable to ESI is the
business records exception.51 How does one establish the requisite
showing of routinized information creation, storage, and maintenance
procedures for locations outside the U.S. and what is the level of proof
required to get that information before a finder of fact? The initiative
breaks down into two categories: (1) enterprise protocols; and (2) laws
48

FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay generally as “a statement that: (1) the declarant
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing, and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”).

49

See FED. R. EVID. 802.

50

See Charles Albert Ross, Evidentiary Issues Regarding Electronically Stored
Information, AVVO (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:01 PM), http;//www.avvo.com/legalguides/ugc/evidentiary-issues-regarding-electronically-stored-information.
51

Id.

14
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that may assist in the establishment of the requisite showing. On this latter
point, one must also ascertain how to prove the existence of the foreign
laws and regulations.
[18] Perhaps the most obvious challenge to foreign ESI falling under
the business records exception is an allegation that the information was
not created or managed pursuant to reliable business practices. The
defense, accordingly, would need to show that the documents were created
and managed by sound processes.52 How does one establish the existence
of reliable practices? One of the many struggles that multi-national
practitioners face is that courts have inconsistently applied the rules of
evidence in this area.53 This is perhaps due to a lack of effort by counsel
to educate the court on the technology at issue and the indicia of reliability
of the information (or, in the cases in which courts have admitted the
evidence without much analysis, lack thereof). The responsibility, Judge
Grimm has noted, is with counsel, in that “they must be the ones to
identify reliability/trustworthiness problems with digital business records,
develop the facts to challenge them, and argue to the courts why the
exception is inapplicable and why the proffered evidence should be
excluded.”54 Of course, the inverse is equally true, significantly so in the
case of non-U.S. ESI: the proponent of the evidence must be sufficiently
versed in the non-U.S. information management protocols that support the
admission of this evidence.55 Counsel must show that the information
offered meets the oft-intertwined criteria of reliability and the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.
[19] There exists considerable overlap between the requirements of
authenticity and those pertaining to establishment of the ESI as a business
52

See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 376.

53

See id. at 407-09.

54

See id. at 409.

55

See infra Part I.G (discussing non-U.S. management protocols).
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record. In In re Vee Vinhnee, the court noted that satisfaction of the
authenticity requirement calls for, among other things, proof (itself in
admissible form) of internal protocols. “[P]olicies and procedures for the
use of the equipment, database, and programs are important. How access
to the [information] is controlled and, separately, how access to the
specific program is controlled are important questions . . . [as well as]
audit procedures for assuring the continuing integrity of the [information]
. . . .”56 In a similar manner, establishment of evidence as a business
record requires a degree of trustworthiness of the electronic information as
a business record, and that trustworthiness must be proven by business
protocols, such as:
evidence to make a clear showing that the digital evidence
relates to a regular activity of the business itself, as
opposed to the personal use of its creator, and that the
business imposed on the employee a requirement to make a
digital record of the occurrence, and thereafter to maintain
that record for purposes of the future use by the company.57
In other words, as the court in In re Vee Vinhnee noted, “the authenticity
analysis is merged into the business record analysis. . . .”58
[20] Cross-border distinctions in business practices can trap the unwary
practitioner and perhaps even the court. A question may arise as to
cultural distinctions in business practices, in that the information
management practices of non-U.S. entities may differ from those typically
seen in the U.S.59 If practices differ, will they meet the level of scrutiny
56

Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437,
445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
57

Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 405.

58

See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 444.

59

David O. Stephens, Putting on a Global Face, DOCUMENTMEDIA.COM,
http://documentmedia.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=Content+Library&type=Publishi
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required for a foundation for ESI? If the entity permits its employees to
use company computers to send and receive personal communications,
does this dilute the business practice with regard to company e-mails and,
if so, to what extent? Does the analysis change in light of the fact that
permission for occasional personal use of company networks is standard in
many U.S. industries (discussed further, infra, in Section V)?60 Opponents
of ESI may find it difficult to challenge the practice on the basis that
personal use is permitted because, in the case of evidence emanating from
an E.U. Member State, local legislation often proscribes the monitoring of
employee network use that could reveal extensive personal
communications.61
[21] Foreign ESI comprising public records may be admissible under
the F.R.E. 803(8) hearsay exception for public records and reports.62 NonU.S. public records may also be admitted, if meeting all other evidentiary

ng&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791
&tier=4&id=EFF25A90A11C4461B855E0037F5814AE (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
60

See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 405 (noting that courts that appreciate this subtlety
“are more likely to be inclined to require strict adherence to each element of Rule
803(6)”).
61

See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 14,
2003, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] [Federal Law Gazette I] at 66, § 20, as
amended, Aug. 14, 2009, BGBL. I at 2814 (Ger.), available at http://www.bfdi.bun
d.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/1086936/publicationFile/87545/BDSG_idFv01092009.pdf;
Personal Data Protection Code, Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, Title X, Ch. 1,
Sec. 121-23 (It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/docum ent?ID=
1219452; [Act on the Protection of Personal Information], Law No. 57 of 2003, art. 27
(Japan), available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf.
62

FED. R. EVID. 803(8); see also Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398,
412 (6th Cir. 2007) (admitting Korean arrest notices, complaint and investigative reports
under FED. R. EVID. 803(8)); infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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criteria, under the residual hearsay exception of F.R.E. 807.63 This “catchall” section provides that a statement that does not fit within the other
enumerated exceptions but comprises “circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness” may be admitted if offered under the following
circumstances, “as evidence of a material fact; . . . is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent
can obtain through reasonable efforts; and . . . admitting it will best serve
the purposes of these rules and the interest of justice.”64 The proponent
must provide advance notice to his or her adversary of the intent to utilize
this exception, including the declarant’s name and address.65 F.R.E. 807
has even been the basis for admission of negative evidence, such as proof
that certain information was not contained in the records of a foreign
government.66
D.

Preservation and Regularity of Foreign Business
Information Generation

[22] Questions of preservation of foreign ESI may enter into the
analysis as well. F.R.E. 803 requires that the information be “kept in the
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business.”67 Judge Grimm
observed that “it may be difficult to show that the e-mails are ‘kept’ for a
‘business activity’ if they are routinely and automatically deleted without
63

FED. R. EVID. 807 (explaining certain circumstances in which hearsay statements are
not excluded, even when not covered by a hearsay exception in FED. R. EVID. 803 or
804).
64

Id.

65

Id.; see also United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984)
(involving an arrangement between U.S. and Panama, which was established through
series of teletype messages received by captain of U.S. Coast Guard ship).
66

See, e.g., United States v. Cahill, No. 85 CR 773, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6350, at *8-9
(N.D. Ill. June 28, 1988).
67

FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added).
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being saved to a file where they will continue to be available for business
purposes.”68
[23] Of course, “keeping,” or “preserving” the information for business
purposes may not seem to be an obvious issue, i.e. if counsel have the
information available for proffer at trial, they clearly have “kept,” or
“preserved” it in some respect.69 The issue will arise when adversary
counsel attempt to challenge the offer of evidence by showing that there is
no established protocol for such preservation. Counsel can, perhaps,
counter this argument with proof that preservation policies outside the
U.S. often differ from those of American companies and that local laws
and regional directives may be further restrictive.70 Therefore, showing a
lack of an American-style preservation policy may not, without more,
sustain an objection to the evidence.
[24] To further complicate matters, preservation in the U.S. sense may,
in many parts of the world, actually violate local law. Within the
European Union, “personal data” —data that can be traced to an
identifiable person—is protected under Privacy Directive 95/46/EC.71 All
E.U. member states have implemented this Directive by local law, as
required by the terms of the Directive.72 Because it is possible to trace email, perhaps the most sought-after form of electronic evidence, to a

68

Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 406.

69

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

70

The conundrum is similar to that for the admissibility standard. See supra notes 60-61
and accompanying text; infra Section V.
71

See generally Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive] (protecting individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data).
72

Directive, supra note 71.
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named sender and/or recipient, it thus constitutes “personal data.”73 The
Directive only allows the “processing” of personal data for limited
purposes.74 The Directive defines “processing” broadly, as “any . . . set of
operations . . . [including but not limited to] collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”75 The
European Commission Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection has
opined that preservation constitutes a form of processing.76
[25] Certain countries, including Germany, France, Korea, Japan, and
Italy, mandate the deletion of protected data after accomplishing the
purpose for which the data was collected.77 In other jurisdictions, business
73

See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY,
OPINION 4/2007 ON THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.
74

See Directive, supra note 71 (defining “processing” and saying that member states
should protect fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular the right to privacy with
respect to processing personal data).
75

Id. (emphasis added) (stating that while the United States does not consider certain
kinds of personal data storage as processing, Directive 95/46 considers any “retention,
preservation, or archiving of data for such purposes” as processing).
76

European Commission, Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 1/2009 on
Pre-Trial Discovery for Cross Border Civil Litigation, at 8 (European Comm’n Working
Paper No. 158, 2009) [hereinafter EU Working Document], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp158_en.pdf.
77

See Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux liberties,
[Act No. 78-17 of 6 Jan. 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files, and Civil
Liberties], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227; Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data
Protection Act], Jan. 14, 2003, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] [Federal Law
Gazette I] at 66, § 20, as amended, Aug. 14, 2009, BGBL. I at 2814 (Ger.), available at
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/1086936/publicationFile/87545/BDSG_
idFv01092009.pdf; Personal Data Protection Code, Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2003, n.
196 (It.), available at http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/document?ID=1219452; [Act
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tradition allows the individual employee to decide whether to retain
business data, whereas in the U.S., an enterprise-wide policy may govern
retention of important business information.78
[26] A comprehensive understanding of what these laws, regulations,
and opinions prohibit and permit, with regard to the “keeping” of
information, is critical for those who would proffer such evidence, as well
as those who would challenge its admission.
E.

Best Evidence/Original Evidence Rule

[27] The best evidence/original evidence rule is the last of the
evidentiary hurdles that counsel must clear in order to successfully admit
Under F.R.E. 1002, the original “writing, recording, or
ESI.79

on the Protection of Personal Information], Law No. 57 of 2003, art. 27 (Japan),
translated at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf; Chan-Mo Chung,
Korea’s Recent Legislation on Online Data Protection, 6 PRIVACY L. & POL’Y REP. 38
(1999), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/1999/46.html.
78

Compare Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that Counsel did not meet the
standard for a litigation hold, in part, by instructing plaintiffs to be over-, rather than
under-, inclusive in collecting and preserving documents since that directive placed “total
reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed to be
responsive records without any supervision from Counsel”), and Phillip M. Adams &
Assocs., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1194 (D. Utah 2009) (holding that
defendant had violated its duty to preserve information, in part because the defendant's
preservation practices “place operations-level employees in the position of deciding what
information is relevant”), with Io Group Inc. v. GLBT Ltd., No. C-10-1282 MMC
(DMR), 2011 WL 4974337, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (finding an adverse inference
charge warranted where the UK defendant admitted deleting e-mails, after receiving
several litigation hold notices, on advice of UK counsel that e-mail retention violated the
Data Protection Act).
79

See generally FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008 (outlining the requirements for the best
evidence rule).
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photograph” is required when it is being offered to prove its content.80
When the original is not available, duplicates are admissible under certain
circumstances pursuant to F.R.E. 1003.81 Thus, provided the printout of a
website or other electronic record accurately reflects the original and no
impropriety is alleged, such as an incomplete or altered record, an e-mail
or database printout should meet the requirements of the original evidence
rule.82 Other exceptions to the original evidence rule include when the
original or any duplicates of the electronic document have been lost or
destroyed absent bad faith by the proponent, and are unavailable by any
judicial process, remain in the possession of an opposing party on notice
that it would be a subject of proof, or prove not relevant to a controlling
issue.83 Under these circumstances, a party may submit proof of the
contents of the ESI through secondary evidence.84
[28] Proof of various laws and regulations, such as Argentina’s
aforementioned Personal Data Protection Act and Israel’s Protection of
80

FED. R. EVID. 1002.

81

See generally FED. R. EVID. 1003; see also United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947 (9th
Cir. 2004) (excluding testimony as to readings of GPS on ground best evidence was a
screen shot or printout); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 576 (D. Md.
2007) (citing People v. Huehn, 53 P.3d 733, 738 (Colo. App. 2002)) (“[Rule 1003]
essentially provides that duplicates are co-extensively admissible as originals, unless
there is a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the original, or the circumstances indicate
that it would be unfair to admit a duplicate in lieu of an original.”).
82

Recall, however, some courts will approach ESI with skepticism. See, e.g., St. Clair v.
Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“While some
look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to
warily and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and
misinformation.”). Even so, recently published decisions seem to indicate that the
opponent must do more than simply suggest that a document may have been altered. See
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006).
83

See FED. R. EVID. 1004.

84

See FED. R. EVID. 1004 advisory committee’s note.
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Privacy Act, may also assist with meeting the evidentiary burdens under
the best evidence/original evidence rule.85 For example, Israeli law may
proscribe transfer of the database, in which case counsel may offer a
report of the database.86 Counsel offering the evidence should be familiar
with the applicable provisions of non-U.S. law, so that he or she may have
a basis for the offer of the report in the absence of the actual database. Of
course, practicalities should also enter into the argument; it is difficult to
export an entire database and impractical to do so for only a few entries,
notwithstanding the fact that juries may not have the patience or
wherewithal to review an entire database. It is particularly critical that
counsel seeking to challenge such truncated evidence on the ground that it
is incomplete or inaccurate, be familiar with the need for, and quantum of,
extrinsic evidence, especially since counsel must make an objection based
on the original evidence rule at the time or risk waiver.87 Section V below
offers practical steps for offering proof of non-U.S. information protocols,
laws, and regulations.
F.

Self-Authentication: Is the Easier Path Available?

[29] The proponent of electronic evidence can avert a great deal of
effort by establishing that the information offered is self-authenticating
pursuant to F.R.E. 902, or state law equivalents,88 which set forth
categories of evidence which do not require extrinsic evidence as a
condition precedent to admissibility.89
F.R.E. 902(5) concerns

85

See supra Part I.B.

86

See Privacy Protection (Transfer of Databases Abroad) Regulations, 2001, KT 5761, 12 (Isr.).
87

See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 579 (D. Md. 2007).

88

See FED. R. EVID. 902; see, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4542(a) (CONSOL. 2011).

89

See FED. R. EVID. 902.
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governmental or public authority records.90 If the ESI (including website
information) contains reliable indicia that it is a public record, it may be
admitted without secondary evidence of authenticity unless the nature of
the ESI as emanating from a governmental authority faces challenges on
other grounds (i.e., relevance, prejudice, hearsay, etc.).91 Pursuant to
F.R.E. 902(4), the ESI may be deemed self-authenticated if appropriately
certified by official record, and thus admissible pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 44(a)(2).92 In a like fashion, F.R.E.
902(12) holds that non-U.S. ESI may be self-authenticating if it is shown,
by appropriate certification, as the product of regularly conducted foreign
business activity.93
[30] The Advisory Committee notes to F.R.C.P. 44(a)(2) explicitly
reference and reproduce in full a treaty known as the Hague Convention
on Abolishing the Requirement for Legalization of Foreign Public
Documents (also known as the Hague Legalization Convention or The
Apostille Convention).94 It may provide an expedient for counsel to have
official documents covered by the treaty admitted under the public records
exception, if a public authority or representative of a public authority in a
signatory state has certified the documents.95 The United States is a

90

FED. R. EVID. 902(5).

91

See FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee’s note.

92

FED. R. EVID. 902(4); see FED. R. CIV. P. 44(a)(2).

93

FED. R. EVID. 902(12).

94

FED. R. CIV. P. 44 advisory committee’s note.

95

See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUTLINE HAGUE
APOSTILLE CONVENTION (2009) [hereinafter HAGUE OUTLINE], available at
www.hcch.net/upload/outline12e.pdf.
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signatory state.96 The U.S. State Department notes that “[t]he treaty
reduces the burden of the cumbersome ‘chain of authentication’ method of
certifying documents which requires a long series of certificates.”97 The
certification, to be appended to the document, is known as an Apostille.98
It contains ten elements, including country, language, and the capacity of
the individual who has certified the document.99 In this way, the treaty
may suffice to deem public documents from a signatory country to fit
within the F.R.E. 902(5) provision for self-authentication.100 Yet the
Convention is not the panacea for evidentiary foundation it may at first
seem. First, the treaty applies only to public documents, though the
definition of a “public document” varies between signatory countries.101
U.S. counsel, in this regard, would be well-advised to obtain local counsel
in the country of origin of the ESI. Second, the Convention dates from
1961, and only provides for Apostilles in paper form, to affix to paper
documents.102 The Hague Conference on Private International Law has
recommended the adoption of electronic Apostilles, or “e-Apps,” for use
96

See Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public
Documents, Oct. 5, 1961, 527 U.N.T.S. 189, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=41.
97

Judicial Assistance – Notarial and Authentication (Apostille), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
[hereinafter Judicial Assistance], http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_2545.html#3
(last visited Feb. 16, 2012).

98

Id.

99

See id. The Apostille comprises ten elements, including country, name of signer,
function of signer, authority of signer, and Apostille registration number. See Model of
Certificate, HAGUE CONF. ON INT’L L., hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/apostille.pdf.
100

See generally FED. R. EVID. 902(5).

101

See HAGUE OUTLINE, supra note 95; Judicial Assistance, supra note 97.

102

See Judicial Assistance, supra note 97 (noting a variety of methods to affix the
Apostille, including “rubber stamp, glue, ribbons, wax seals, impressed seals, selfadhesive stickers, etc.”).
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with documents in electronic format and, to that end, has facilitated a Pilot
Program for the use of e-Apps.103 Not all signatory countries have
adopted the e-App, however, and therefore the utility of the Convention
for foreign ESI is limited to data and electronic documents from
participating signatory states.104
[31] The inability to obtain an appropriate certification does not
necessarily prove fatal to self-authentication of foreign public records. If
the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the
authenticity and accuracy of the records, counsel may offer an attested
copy without certification upon an appropriate showing of good cause.105
[32] F.R.E. 902(7) provides for self-authentication if the record bears
“[A]n inscription, sign, tag or label purporting to have been affixed in the
course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control.”106 At
first glance, this would appear to cover foreign e-mail that bears signature
stamps or signature blocks of the corporate entity from which it emanated.
Judge Grimm has cautioned, though, that “simply because an individual’s
sending address is present on an e-mail does not constitute definitive proof
that the person actually sent the e-mail, and authentication of an e-mail
could still possibly require testimony from a person with personal
knowledge of the transmission or its receipt to ensure its

103

See Closer and Closer to Reality: The e-Apostille Pilot Program of the HCCH and the
NNA, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (2006),
www.hcch.net/upload/e-app-fnl.pdf.
104

Operational e-Registers by State, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=146 (last visited Feb. 16,
2012).
105

See In re Letter of Request from Boras Dist. Court, Swed., 153 F.R.D. 31, 35-36
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also United States v. Yousef, 175 F.R.D. 192, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
106

FED. R. EVID. 902(7).
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trustworthiness.”107 Indeed, he also notes that as of 2009, “no case since
Lorraine has discussed the use of [F.R.E.] Rule 902(7) to gauge the
authenticity of an e-mail.”108
[33] F.R.E. 902(12) may prove the most efficient path to admission, for
at least certain types of ESI. F.R.E. 902(12) specifically concerns
“Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.”109 By
reference to F.R.E. 902(11), this provision requires that the evidence be
admissible under F.R.E. 803(6)(A)-(C) (a business records exception for
“Records of Regularly Conducted Activity”), if accompanied by a
declaration certifying:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business . . .; and
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that
activity.110
107

Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 389.

108

Id. Consider that the absence of supportive case law may not necessarily indicate an
unwillingness on the part of the judiciary to allow for the self-authentication of foreign
ESI pursuant to F.R.E. 902(7), but rather, that F.R.E. 902(7) foundations may have gone
unutilized or unchallenged. Accordingly, counsel should not rule out admission via
F.R.E. 902(7), in the absence of better foundational avenues, or as a last resort.

109

FED. R. EVID. 902(12). Congress amended FED. R. EVID. 902 in 2010 to include
subdivisions (11) and (12). As noted by the advisory committee, the rule “sets forth a
procedure by which parties can authenticate certain records of regularly conducted
activity, other than through the testimony of a foundation witness,” and 902(12) serves as
the civil analog to 18 USC § 3505, enacted in 1984, which provides a means for
certifying foreign records of regularly conducted activity in criminal cases. FED R. EVID.
902 advisory committee’s note; see United States v. Laurent, No. 04-4745, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6023, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2006).
110

FED. R. EVID 803(6).
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[34] Furthermore, “[t]he declaration must be signed in a manner that, if
falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty in the country
where the certification is signed.”111 In St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v.
FDIC, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida admitted
bank records from a bank in El Salvador, after affording the FDIC an
opportunity to obtain proper certification of a declaration that had
appropriately demonstrated the above-mentioned four elements.112 The
court took judicial notice of a Salvadoran law that banking institutions in
El Salvador must provide data and information regarding their operations
and activities when requested by the Financial System of El Salvador
(SSF).113 The court found that the person certifying the records was
“qualified” because his position and experience demonstrated sufficient
familiarity with the records such that he could attest to the reliability of the
banking records:
[He] has been the superintendent and president of the board
of directors of the SSF, the SSF oversees and regulates El
Salvador's financial system; under Salvadoran law, banking
institutions, such as Banco Cuscatlán, are required to
provide data and information regarding their operations and
activities when requested by the SSF. Based on these
criteria, the Court . . . determined that [the certifying
declarant’s] position and experience demonstrate[d] . . .
sufficient familiarity with these types of records such that
he is qualified to attest to the reliability of the records at
issue here.114
111

FED. R. EVID. 902(12).

112

See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. FDIC, No. 08-21192-CIV-GARBER, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62604, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2011). See generally St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v.
FDIC, No. 08-21192-CIV-GARBER, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103135, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 13, 2011).
113

See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62604, at *4.

114

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10315, at *7.
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The court also concluded that in meeting the four elements of F.R.E.
902(12), the proponent had satisfied the requirements of the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.115 Similarly, in United States v.
Laurent, a matter concerning a fraudulent visa application, the trial court
apparently permitted the government to admit a visa application from
Estonia with the condition that the government ultimately produce a
certification to authenticate the document (which it did not have at that
time), or else the court would “back [the document] out” of evidence.116
[35] Meeting all the elements necessary to demonstrate the
trustworthiness of a document frequently takes on heightened significance
when the source of the evidence comes from beyond U.S. borders. For
example, in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, medical evidence from
Guatemala, which consisted of testimony from an attending physician and
medical notes, did not meet the requirements of F.R.E. 902(12), as the
documents were neither an original nor duplicate of certified foreign
records of regularly conducted activity admissible under F.R.E. 803(6).117
Yet, in United States v. Parker, involving cases of Dewars Scotch lifted
from a foreign carrier shipment, a United Kingdom certificate for exports
to the U.S. was admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under F.R.E.
803(6) because “circumstantial evidence and testimony suggested
trustworthiness.”118 While the document was not authenticated under
F.R.E. 902(12) (i.e., it was not self-authenticated via certification), the
court found the testimony of the sole U.S. importer for Dewar's Scotch
amply demonstrated the trustworthiness of the document and showed the
document was a business record.119 Here, the nature of the document
115

Id. at *11.

116

See United States v. Laurent, No. 04-4745, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6023, at *5 (4th
Cir. Mar. 10, 2006).

117

See Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156–57 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

118

United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984).

119

Id.

29

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

indicated to the court its reliability and authenticity and justified its
admission as an exception to the hearsay rule.120
[36] The declaration requirement sounds very much like the foundation
requirements for admission under the business records hearsay exception,
described above, but the comparison’s ease may be deceptive. One may
not always have success in obtaining such a declaration, due to the
information management practices of the entity in question or
recalcitrance of the entity to submit such a declaration.121 Non-e-mail
communications, such as text messages, Instant Messages, and blog and
social media posts, may not rise to the “regular activity” requirement of
F.R.E. 902(12) or, for that matter, F.R.E. 803(6).122 The “regular activity”
criterion, along with temporal requirements (“made at or near the time of
the occurrence”), and the F.R.E. 803(6) criterion that the evidence be
created by a person “with knowledge” and pursuant to a “business
activity,” may provide grounds for challenge, but it is important to keep in
mind that these terms and categories may have entirely different meanings
and uses outside the U.S. due to linguistic issues, business practices, and
cultural distinctions.123
G.

[37]

Proof of Non-U.S. Information Protocols, Laws and
Regulations and Language Translation

Where extrinsic evidence is required to authenticate foreign ESI,

120

See id. The witness specifically testified that “[the] document was a customs
certificate of the United Kingdom representing proof that the Scotch had been imported
and thus the purchaser could avoid taxation in the United Kingdom for the cases of
Scotch listed on the certificate.” Id. But see discussion of admissibility under the F.R.E.
807(b) residual exception to the hearsay rule, supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.

121

Compare FED. R. EVID. 902(12), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6).

122

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); FED. R. EVID. 902(12).

123

See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); FED. R. EVID. 902(12); supra Part I.B.
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what form should it take? How does one go about proving foreign law
and regulations? The first practical suggestion is for the parties to agree
on translation of the language(s) used by the authors of the evidence, for
both the evidence itself as well as the extrinsic matters offered in support
of the evidence. If no agreement exists, the court may order the
translators’ documents, or a hearing for the conflicting versions pursuant
to F.R.E. 702.124
1. The Declaration has been discussed above with regard to the
certification of the need to dispense with extrinsic evidence,
but a declaration of a different sort may serve to provide the
necessary evidence of the computer and information
management protocols that demonstrate indicia of reliability, as
well as the regularity of the particular electronic activity in
order to fit the evidence under one of the hearsay exceptions.125
The practitioner should pay careful attention to the court’s
rules as to how far in advance of the trial, if at all, such
declarations must be served upon the other parties, and whether
the declarant may be subject to deposition.
2. A Witness with Knowledge of the Facts is often the most
compelling support of the offer of proof. The witness can
testify to a host of subjects, such as authenticity by virtue of the
witness’s knowledge of the information (i.e., he or she sent or
received it), computer systems and information governance
policies and procedures, identifying characteristics of the data,
or business regularity with which the proffered types of data
are created or received.126
3. Testimony of an Expert is particularly useful where one
challenges, or must defend a challenge to, the reliability of the
124

FED. R. EVID. 702.

125

See generally supra Part I.F.

126

See RICE, supra note 8, at 229-230, 232, 251. See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(B)(1).
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system or applications that created the proffered data or the
chain of custody for the data.
Among other subjects
appropriate for expert testimony are (i) the distinctive
characteristics of the proffered evidence (hash values,
metadata, replies to e-mails, etc.) (these may not require expert
testimony, depending upon prior rulings and the style of the
case),127 (ii) the system’s capacity to produce reliable
information by virtue of its architecture, configuration, and
maintenance, and (iii) the training of both the IT staff tasked
with maintaining target systems as well as the end-users of
those systems. However, the expert may be subject to the
requirement for preparation and service of a report and for
deposition pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26 or 30(b)(6).128 The expert’s
potential testimony may also be subject to challenge under
F.R.E. 702-704 and pursuant (depending upon the state) to
preclusion motions and hearings pursuant to Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals129 or Frye v. United States.130
4. Certifications of Non-U.S. Counsel may be warranted to prove
non-U.S. law. These may be challenged pursuant to F.R.E.
702, particularly if there are conflicting schools of thought on
the scope of the particular law or regulations. The court may
(and most often will) research the law on its own.131
Instructive on this point in this regard is the case of In re
Rivastigmine Patent Litigation,132 in which the court, faced
127

See Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 392.

128

See id. at 377. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26.

129

509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).

130

293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

131

See FED. R. EVID. 702.

132

237 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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with voluminous privilege logs comprising objections to data
produced from nearly forty countries, ruled upon the quantum
and quality of proof of privilege in the subject countries.133
Where there was no support from an affidavit of counsel from
the subject country, or the affidavit did not provide sufficient
information for the court to assess the assertion of privilege,
the court ordered production of the disputed data.134
5. Translations should be the subject of agreement between
counsel but, in litigation, the most obvious subjects for
cooperation between counsel may become contentious and
lengthy battles. While there is no requirement that non-U.S.
data created in another language be translated in English for
production in discovery,135 the information cannot be offered
into evidence unless translated into English. An inability to
reach agreement on translation, such as may occur with regard
to dialects in Chinese or Hindi, may result in a F.R.E. 702
hearing on the correct English iteration of the evidence.136
Discussion of these issues early in the litigation may result in
agreement that can avoid the time and expense of such
hearings.
[38] Even after counsel has undergone the often arduous task of
retrieving foreign-based ESI and clearing all of the aforementioned
admissibility hurdles, courts may nonetheless exclude relevant ESI on one
133

See id. at 87-88.

134

See id. at 84.

135

See In re P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 509 n.3 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Congress
could perhaps impose such a rule if it so desired, but the present Federal Rules provide no
authority for such an extraordinary burden on foreign parties.”).

136

See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the
trial judge’s gatekeeping function to determine reliability of evidence applies to all expert
testimony). See generally FED. R. EVID. 702.
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or more of the grounds articulated in F.R.E. 403 (i.e., unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, undue delay, etc.).137
III. CHALLENGES TO ADMISSIBILITY BASED ON PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY CONDUCT
[39] Circumstances in which counsel may be precluded from using
otherwise admissible non-U.S. information include the failure to comply
with discovery orders, or to comply with notice requirements.138 While
such compliance is not a strictly evidentiary criterion, from a practical
standpoint, litigation counsel should remain cognizant of the consequences
of such omissions and other activities during discovery.139 For example,
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), provided the lawsuit is not an action
described in F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(B), or unless otherwise ordered or
stipulated:
[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to the other parties… a copy—or a description by
category and location—of all documents, electronically
stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use

137

See generally FED. R. EVID. 403 (precluding evidence in ESI cases, which may arise
where there are confusing voluminous records, biased record summaries, computer
animations that portray a matter unfairly, or electronic or text messages that contain
highly offensive or derogatory language). This article will not focus on prejudice, but the
reader is instructed to note that, as with paper documents, the proponent of any ESI must
be prepared to argue not only relevance, but that the evidence’s relevance preponderates
over any unfair prejudice (as well as any other applicable exclusionary F.R.E. 403
factors).
138

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (c)(1).

139

See, e.g., Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Alaska 2005)
(noting that the burden is on the disclosing party to ensure disclosure is complete and
excluding documents not properly disclosed).
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to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be
solely for impeachment.140
[40] Under F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(E), failing to fully investigate the case,
challenging the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures, or the other
party’s failure to make its initial disclosures, will not excuse a party from
making its F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) disclosures and may result in sanctions,
including but not limited to, preclusion of certain evidence.141 Moreover,
F.R.C.P. 37 allows the court to impose broad sanctions for discoveryrelated abuses, and in the case of bad faith, the court may impose
sanctions based on its “inherent power to manage its own affairs.”142
F.R.C.P. 37(c)(1) specifically provides that evidence will be excluded for
failure to comply with F.R.C.P. 26(a) under certain conditions:
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness
as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to
use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or was harmless.143
[41] Thus, F.R.C.P. 37 sanctions give yet another reason for counsel to
identify the documents they intend to rely upon, as well as the witnesses
likely to have discoverable information, early on in litigation, in
compliance with F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1).144 Should a party fail to disclose
copies, or even a description by category and location, of electronically
stored information, there is a palpable risk that the court will exclude such
140

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A).

141

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E).

142

Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106-07 (2d Cir.
2002).
143

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).

144

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
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ESI when it is submitted in support of a motion or trial.145 A certification
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(g) made without the required diligence and
investigation—i.e., a certification that all documents demanded have been
disclosed when, in fact, certain documents have not been produced—may
also subject counsel to sanctions.146
[42] Disclosure can become a nettlesome issue for a proponent of nonU.S. ESI because of the collision between U.S. discovery rules and nonU.S. privacy and data protection laws.147 A party that declines to provide
certain information during discovery on the grounds that doing so would
violate the laws of the host country and, perhaps, subject the litigant to
civil or criminal proceedings, may well find itself precluded from offering
like kind evidence at trial, and may be subject to other sanctions as well.148
In Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, the government of
Spain propounded discovery requests but resisted discovery demands
served upon it on the ground that compliance would violate Spanish
privacy law. 149 The court ordered the Spanish government to comply with
the discovery demands, holding that Spain, which chose a U.S. venue for
its suit, was bound to comply with U.S. discovery rules.150
145

See, e.g., Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 338 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(prohibiting use of materials that were improperly disclosed under F.R.C.P.
26(a)(1)(A)(ii)); Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Alaska
2005).

146

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).

147

See Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81415, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006).

148

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A)-(C) (providing that, if a party fails to disclose information
“the party is not allowed to use that information… at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless,” and the party may also be subject to other
sanctions).
149

See Reino De Espana, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41498, at *3-4.

150

See id. at *26. Ultimately, Spain narrowly escaped an adverse inference charge, even
though the court found it negligently failed to implement a timely litigation hold, because
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[43] The national oil company of Venezuela found itself in a similar
situation in Lynodell-Citgo Refining P.P. v. Petroleos de Venezuela,
S.A.151 The defendant was served with a discovery demand for minutes of
its board of directors.152 Compliance with the demand, which would have
of necessity divulged the identity of the directors and placed them at a
particular location on a certain date, would have violated Venezuela’s
Special Law Against Information Systems Crimes and subjected the
defendant to potential criminal prosecution.153 Because the defendant
declined to comply with a court order directing provision of the minutes,
the court sanctioned the defendant with an adverse inference jury
instruction.154 While not specifically addressed in the decision, there is
little doubt that Petroleos de Venezuela, having raised an objection to
producing the minutes because of the requirements of local law, would
have been precluded from offering similar evidence at trial.155 Counsel,
then, should carefully weigh its position and the relative risks when
considering whether to bring applications to quash subpoenas or motions
for Protective Orders on the basis of local privacy or data protection laws.
pplaintiff could not demonstrate that the missing evidence was relevant. See id. at *2124. But cf. IO Group Inc. v. GLBT LTD., No. C 10 1282 MMC (DMR), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 120815, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (granting pplaintiff’s motion for an
adverse inference charge against ddefendant).
151

See Lyondell-Citgo Refining, LP v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A., No. 02 Civ.
0795(CBM), 2005 WL 356808, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2005).

152

Id.

153

See id.

154

See id. at *1-2, 4. An adverse inference jury instruction advises the jury that the
producing party had a legal duty to produce the subject information but did not do so, and
that the jury may presume, though it is not required to do so, that the subject information
would have been adverse to the position of the jury at trial. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,
L.L.C., 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
155

Cf. Reino De Espana, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41498, at *26; notes 149-50 and
accompanying text.
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A long view toward trial is often advisable in formulating discovery
strategy.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF NON-U.S. ESI IN MOTION PRACTICE
[44] The rules that govern the admission of documentary evidence at
trial apply with equal force to dispositive and in limine motions that
require support by proof in admissible form; however, recent changes in
procedural rules have altered the logistics and burdens for demonstrating
admissibility of supporting documents for such motions.156
[45] F.R.C.P. 56 governs summary judgment practice.157 Until very
recently, the rule clearly stated that unauthenticated documents may not be
considered on a motion for summary judgment.158 Under F.R.C.P. 56,
parties were required to present documentary proof in admissible form in
support of summary judgment papers.159 Accordingly, counsel was
essentially required to lay the foundation for every piece of documentary
evidence appended to their summary judgment motions. Failure to
comply with this requirement would preclude the court from considering
the evidence, sometimes resulting in summary judgment decisions in
which the judiciary would lambast counsel for foundational omissions.160
Bowers v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia provides a
cautionary tale as the evidence takes on the additional layer of complexity,
such as those encountered with ESI from other countries. 161 In Bowers,
156

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Supp. IV 2010).

157

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56.

158

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Supp. III 2009).

159

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1) (Supp. III 2009).

160

See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.

161

Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, No. 3:06cv00041, 2007 WL
2963818, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 9, 2007); accord Grimm et al., supra note 4, at 369-70.
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an employment matter alleging improper termination, counsel appended
600 pages of e-mails and website printouts.162 Her foundation for
authentication comprised mostly counsel’s own affidavit averring the
information’s authenticity because “the e-mails had been obtained from
the defendants during the course of discovery and the web pages were
taken from ‘published’ internet web sites.”163 The court, in granting the
defendants’ motion for sanctions pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(g), excoriated
counsel as follows:
[T]he submission by plaintiff’s counsel of . . . more than
fifty unauthenticated copies of e-mails convincingly
demonstrates both a recklessness and an absence of
preparation on the part of plaintiff’s counsel. Equally so,
her resort to use of her own affidavit in a misguided quickand-easy attempt to fix significant evidentiary deficiencies,
demonstrates a recklessness in preparation and a failure to
exercise legal judgment abject.164
[46] In 2010, the Supreme Court introduced a new subdivision of
F.R.C.P. 56, Subdivision (c), which “establishes a common procedure for
several aspects of summary-judgment motions . . . .” 165 Subdivision (c),
entitled “Procedures,” provides in relevant part:
(1)
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
162

Bowers, 2007 WL 2963818, at *1.

163

Id. at *2.

164

Id. at *7.

165

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) advisory committee’s notes (Supp. IV 2010).
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(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
...
(2)
A party may object that the material cited to support
or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would
be admissible in evidence.166
[47] Subdivision (c)(2) sets out a new procedure for submitting
documentary proof in support of summary judgment motions.167 The
advisory committee summarized this procedure as follows:
[A] party may object that material cited to support or
dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence. The objection functions much as an
objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The
burden is on the proponent to show that the material is
admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form
that is anticipated. There is no need to make a separate
motion to strike. If the case goes to trial, failure to
challenge admissibility at the summary-judgment stage
does not forfeit the right to challenge admissibility at
trial.168

166

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).

167

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2010). In addition to motions for summary
judgment, the admissibility issue may arise as early as pre-answer motion practice.
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(d): “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P
12(d).

168

FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c)(2) committee notes on rules (Supp. IV 2010).
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[48] Ostensibly, Subdivision (c) may obviate the need for counsel to
provide the basis for a document’s admissibility. The language is
ambiguous, and with the exception of Foreword Magazine v. Overdrive,
the courts have yet to weigh in on whether unchallenged evidence, for
which counsel has laid no foundation, will be considered on summary
judgment. 169 Indeed, the new F.R.C.P. 56(c) creates more questions than
it answers. For example, does the new rule suggest that only after
objection does the burden shift to the proponent to demonstrate
admissibility?170 For this reason alone, the wording of the subdivision
should give counsel pause because it does not speak on whether a court
may exclude evidence on a sua sponte basis, especially in light of case law
under the former F.R.C.P. 56, which, by and large, holds that “[a] trial
court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”171 One must question whether this holding is
consistent with the procedure articulated in the new subdivision and, if so,
how.
[49] In Foreword Magazine, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan explained that the new subdivision had replaced
former F.R.C.P. 56(2), which had unequivocally mandated authentication
for documents presented in summary judgment motions.172 But, the court
warned, as a result of the 2010 amendments to F.R.C.P. 56, parties must
169

Foreword Magazine, Inc. v. Overdrive, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1144, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125373, at *3-6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2011) (“Thus, the amendment replaces a
clear, bright-line rule (‘all documents must be authenticated’) with a multi-step process
by which a proponent may submit evidence, subject to objection by the opponent and an
opportunity for the proponent to either authenticate the document or propose a method to
doing so at trial.”).
170

See 11 JAMES WM. ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.91[7] (3d ed. 2011) (“If
a party fails to object to the inadmissibility of evidence submitted by its opponent in the
summary judgment proceedings, the court may consider the evidence.”).
171

Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

172

See Foreword Magazine, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125373, at *3-4.
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not disregard the prevailing authorities but, in fact, should read them very
carefully.173 The Foreword Magazine court found that the “unequivocal
requirement” of authentication for documents submitted in support of
summary judgment papers was effectively eliminated.174 According to the
Foreword Magazine court, the opponent must now object to the
admissibility of evidence, demonstrating a paradigm shift from objection
that the item “has not” been submitted in admissible form to objection that
it “cannot” be.175 The court interpreted the comments to the 2010
amendments to mean that “the drafters intended to make summary
judgment practice conform to procedure at trial.”176
[50] Foreword Magazine is one of very few published decisions
interpreting the significance of the new F.R.C.P. 56(c); in contrast, some
other decisions cite to earlier versions of the statute, indicating that some
litigators and judiciary may rely on the old rule in support of their briefs
and decisions.177 This presents a conundrum for practitioners making
dispositive motions. If they submit materials in support of their summary
judgment motion without laying any evidentiary foundation whatsoever,
in reliance on the new F.R.C.P. 56(c), will they be penalized for the
omission as though the old rule were still in effect? This risk may be
heightened when citing to foreign ESI in support of or opposition to
dispositive motions, as authenticity issues may loom large in the mind of
the judge considering the motion. In this regard, it is helpful to recall that
the court, even if it is well aware of the new procedure, may exclude the

173

Id. at *4.

174

Id.

175

Id. at *5.

176

Id.

177

See, e.g., Arroyo-Perez v. Demir Grp. Int’l, 762 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376 (Dist. P.R.
2011).
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evidence sua sponte or, as the court stated in Foreword, hold the
proponent of the evidence to trial standards of authentication.178
[51] Thus, the practitioner who plans to rely on Subdivision (c) by
appending ESI proof to a dispositive motion without providing the
evidentiary basis for its admissibility would be well advised to assess the
risk of exclusion or disregard of the evidence by the court. To make this
assessment, counsel should be knowledgeable about local rules,179 any
prior decisions of the motion court with regard to the new procedure, and
how the court has considered ESI proof generally as well as ESI from
outside the U.S.
[52] An opposing party’s level of cooperation may also influence
counsel’s course of action. For example, in the case of a foreign party
unfamiliar with U.S. litigation, from a jurisdiction in which privacy and/or
data protection laws may give such party pause when it comes to fully
complying with the discovery process, any delay or impairment of
counsel’s ability to ascertain all the information necessary to overcoming
evidentiary hurdles may make submitting documents in accordance with
Subdivision (c)’s new procedure very attractive, provided the court
follows the logic articulated in the Foreword decision. The case arguably
affords counsel the opportunity to seek the disposition of a matter without

178

See Foreward Magazine, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125373, at *5.

179

Some U.S. District Court local rules mirror the new F.R.C.P. subdivision. See, e.g.,
U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF OR. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 56-1(b) (2011), available at
http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/en/local-rules-of-civil-procedure/lr-56-summary-judgment.
Others resemble the old version of F.R.C.P. 56. See, e.g., LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S.
DIST. COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTS. OF NEW YORK, LOCAL RULE
56.1 (2011), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/docs/localrules.pdf; see also
LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S. DIST. COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTS. OF
NEW YORK, LOCAL RULE 56.1, advisory committee’s note (2011), available at
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/docs/localrules.pdf (“the Committee believes that the
language adopted in 2004 sets forth these requirements clearly, and does not recommend
any changes in that language.”).
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being forced to submit evidence in admissible form when, under the
circumstances, such evidence is not easily authenticated.
[53] The pretrial discovery phase of litigation also offers other
opportunities to tackle thorny evidentiary issues involving foreign ESI.
Under F.R.C.P. 36, for example, a party may request that his or her
adversary admit to the “genuineness of a document,”180 which may be of
mutual benefit in matters where both parties are multinational entities.
Litigants should raise these issues, and others regarding foreign ESI
authentication issues, at the earliest opportunities, including discovery
conferences pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(f) and 16.181
[54] Motions in limine present another key opportunity to address the
exclusion or admission of evidence in advance of trial. The purpose of a
motion in limine is typically to limit or exclude certain evidence or
testimony, but it may also be used by a proponent seeking to admit
evidence.182 The motion is generally made at the commencement of
trial,183 and the judge hears it outside the presence of the jury. Motions in
limine can be an important tool for trial counsel and can accordingly
reduce the number of disruptions (e.g., side-bar conferences and
objections) during trial.184 More important, a motion in limine permits the
court to rule on the relevance and admissibility of evidence before counsel
180

FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being
served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written
answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.”).
181

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).

182

See FED. R. EVID. 104; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (9th ed. 2009).

183

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (9th ed. 2009).

184

See Bastilla v. The Village of Cahokia, No. 06-CV-0150-MJR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1939, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (citing Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.
1996)) (explaining that motions in limine can speed up the trial process by avoiding
interruptions and lengthy arguments at trial).
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offers it at trial, thus reducing time spent in hearings outside the presence
of the jury.185
[55] In the case of foreign ESI, a motion in limine hearing may serve as
an opportunity for counsel to fully educate the court on the source,
creation, and maintenance of the proffered data or documents.186 This, in
turn, may well trigger the judge to initiate a F.R.E. 104(a) examination of
the evidence.187 F.R.E. 104(a) provides that: “the court must decide any
preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege
exists, or evidence is admissible.”188 Generally, the proponent will carry
the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of evidence on preliminary
questions concerning admissibility.189 Conversely, under F.R.E. 104(b),
the court does not employ the same standard as under F.R.E. 104(a) when

185

See id. Hearings on admissibility during state court trials, known as voir dire, are
conducted outside the hearing of the jury.
186

See generally 21 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5037.10 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that
motions in limine “[allow] the parties to more thoroughly brief the law and the court to
consider the arguments more thoroughly than would be possible in the heat of trial”); G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 957 (1996) (explaining that early 104(a) rulings
help to educate judges about special vocabulary before evidence begins to come in).
187

See Bastilla, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1939 at *1-2 (both parties’ motions in limine
caused the judge to conduct F.R.E. 104 analysis). Also note that, under F.R.E. 104(c),
there is no guarantee that once trial is underway, a hearing on admissibility will be
conducted outside the presence of the jury, unless the court is ruling on the admissibility
of a confession; the interests of justice require it; or it is at the request of a witness, and
that witness is the accused. FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
188

FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that a court ruling on the admissibility of evidence is
“not bound by the rules of evidence except those on privilege”).
189

See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10 (1993);
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507,
511 (3d Cir. 1985).
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deciding questions of conditional relevancy.190 Instead, the standard is
effectively a prima facie standard, as the trial court only determines
whether the proponent presented sufficient evidence to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition.191 The distinction, in practice, is
subtle.192
[56] Discovery conferences pursuant to F.R.C.P. 16, and other pre-trial
conferences, provide additional opportunities to preliminarily address
admissibility.193 For example, F.R.C.P. 16(c)(2) not only permits counsel
to request that the adversary stipulate to the authenticity of documents,
including ESI, but also allows the court the chance to assess the
evidentiary issues and take appropriate action to address any such
applications.194 Thus, an opposing counsel’s refusal of the request could
prompt a F.R.E. 104(a) examination of the foundational grounds for the
document’s admissibility, at which time, depending on the evidentiary
rules at issue, counsel could make a prima facie showing of authenticity to
the court.195
190

See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.
The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced
later.”).
191

Id.

192

See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. L.E. Myers Co. Grp., 937 F. Supp.
276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (illustrating that when the court “lacks the necessary
specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded,” the motion can be denied).
Moreover, the court may in its discretion alter an in limine ruling at trial. Luce v. United
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984).
193

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16.

194

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2).

195

See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (authorizing the court to determine preliminary admissibility
matters including whether the proponent of evidence has laid down a sufficient
foundation, from which the jury could find the evidence is authentic).
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AUTHENTICATION OF SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF ESI
ENCOUNTERED IN CROSS BORDER MATTERS

[57] Historically, as technological innovations have given rise to new
types of evidence, judges have initially met such offerings with a
significant level of skepticism, especially with regard to evidence
collected from the Internet.196 However, the approach of U.S. courts
toward authenticating electronic evidence has evolved. Some courts still
may suggest that “the complex nature of computer storage calls for a more
comprehensive foundation,”197 but others hold that discovery of new types
of ESI “requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel
context.”198 While ESI authentication occurs in the same manner as any
other type of evidence, different forms of ESI have distinct characteristics
and qualities that impact admissibility. In a world where paper documents
compare to electronic information as the horse and buggy compares to the
196

See St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D.
Tex. 1999). In holding the plaintiff’s proffered data from the US Coast Guard’s online
vessel database insufficient, U.S. District Judge Samuel Kent stated “[w]hile some look
to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to warily
and wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and
misinformation.” Id. Judge Kent went on to state:
[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is monitored
for accuracy and nothing contained therein is under oath or even
subject to independent verification absent underlying documentation.
Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the
content on any web-site from any location at any time. For these
reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost
nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay
exception rules. . . .
Id.
197

United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1976).

198

Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 434
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (in reference to social networking sites).
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automobile and where online interaction is the daily norm, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to explicitly cover the
discovery of “electronically stored information,”199 and courts have begun
to apply the rules of admissibility to the realities of the Digital Age. This
section will address the issues associated with the admissibility of types of
ESI frequently encountered during disputes between multinational entities,
namely e-mails, text messages, instant messages, electronic chat logs, web
pages, archived Internet content, social media, Internet tracking
information, and log files.
A.

E-mail

[58] As attractive markets abroad entice U.S. companies to expand
overseas and the Internet continues to erode traditional barriers between
foreign companies and U.S. consumers, more subsidiaries and affiliates of
U.S. companies and foreign companies doing business in the U.S. will
find themselves subject to the long arm of U.S. jurisdiction.200 E-mail
serves as a primary bridge to facilitate the communication that makes this
global interconnectivity possible.201 The more we e-mail, the more e-mail
will be potentially relevant to U.S. legal proceedings.
[59] When offering e-mail into evidence, counsel must show that the
information is self-authenticating under F.R.E. 902202 or meet the
199

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).

200

See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1068 (3d ed.) (discussing how long-arm statutes have expanded over
time to allow for jurisdiction over foreign companies performing significant business in
the United States, either at the state or national level).
AND

201

See SEDONA FRAMEWORK, supra note 1 at 1.

202

Courts most often deem e-mail evidence to be self-authenticating under FED. R. EVID.
902(7) (Trade Inscriptions and the Like), and FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (Certified Domestic
Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity).
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standards for authentication under F.R.E. 901.203 Where a proponent
makes no attempt to authenticate e-mail evidence by offering any
explanation as to its origin, the court will likely rule that the document is
unauthenticated and thus inadmissible.204 As with any other evidence,
counsel must take steps to show that the e-mail is what it purports to be.
Testimony from one with personal knowledge of the e-mail in question is
a widely accepted method for showing an e-mail’s authenticity.205
Furthermore, many courts have held that live testimony of a witness with
personal knowledge may not be necessary if an affidavit of such a witness,
combined with non-hearsay evidence of identifying characteristics (such
as the URL address, date of the exchange, print date, profile names of the
messengers, identity of the sender and recipient, etc.), is available to show
authenticity:
The lower [federal] courts generally hold that an affidavit
of a witness, when viewed in combination with
circumstantial indicia of authenticity (such as the existence
of the URL, date of printing, or other identifying

203

See FED. R. EVID. 901; United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40-41
(discussing how e-mail may be authenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence). It is
important to note that in many courts, parties must address authentications and other
admissibility issues with regards to each individual e-mail comprising a chain or thread.
See, e.g., New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233, 2002 WL 649951 at *5
(D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the individual e-mail messages did not overcome the hearsay
requirements to be admitted).
204

See Boyd v. Toyobo Am., Inc. (In re Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.), 434 B.R.
502, 505 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that e-mail was not properly authenticated
where it bore no indicia of authenticity and the e-mail was an internal communication
between employees of a non-party company, and the proponent’s witness was not an
employee of that company, was not listed as a recipient of the e-mail, and testified that he
had never seen the e-mail).
205

See Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D. Md. 2007).
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information) would support a reasonable juror in the belief
that the documents are what the proponent says they are.206
[60] Despite the fact that e-mails present numerous metadata fields and
other characteristics that can be used as indicia of authenticity, F.R.E. 901
sets a relatively low bar for clearing the authenticity hurdle since the
proponent must only “produce evidence to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims.”207 In other words, judges may leave
questions of origin, business practices, etc. to the jury to attach such
importance as they deem appropriate. Furthermore, the court need not
make a determination that the evidence is what the proponent claims,
rather, it should determine whether there is evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to make that determination.208 Once meeting this
“minimal authentication requirement,” arguments concerning the accuracy
of the printouts go only to weight, not admissibility.209
[61] In the case of e-mail collected from foreign sources, obtaining
evidence supporting authenticity in the form of live testimony from the
sender or recipient of an e-mail, or the controller of a server where the e-

206

Foreword Magazine v. OverDrive, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1144, 2011 WL 5169384 at *3
(W.D. Mich. 2011).
207

FED. R. EVID. 901(a).

208

See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (“The threshold for the Court’s determination of
authenticity is not high… The Court need not find that the evidence is necessarily what
the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately
might do so.” (citations omitted)).
209

See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001). Computer
printouts of records maintained by the Colorado Bureau of Investigation were deemed
authenticated through testimony by a government witness that the printouts reflected the
Bureau’s record of information about the ddefendant’s business. Id. The court went on
to note that such public records can be authenticated by showing custody and nothing
more. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 901, advisory committee notes, 1972 Proposed Rules).
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mail is held, may not be possible or practical.210 For example, if the
witness is in a foreign country, he or she may be beyond subpoena power,
or may not be willing to travel to the U.S. If so, is the witness willing to
provide oral testimony, an affidavit, sworn declaration, or unsworn
declaration as permitted by 28 U.S.C. §1746? It may be that the
applicable laws of the foreign country (such as blocking statutes that
proscribe testimony or evidence provided for a foreign judicial
proceeding),211 company culture, or local customs may preclude a witness
from testifying in the litigation.212
[62] If authenticating direct testimony, whether oral or written, should
prove impractical, and assuming that such e-mails are not selfauthenticating under F.R.E. 902 or other provisions, counsel must look to
other modes of authentication through more circumstantial evidence such
as (i) expert testimony, (ii) comparison of the e-mail to another
communication that has already been authenticated, (iii) distinctive
characteristics and other circumstances indicating reliability, or (iv) some
other method sufficient to clear the authenticity hurdle.213 It behooves
counsel to gather all identifying and circumstantial evidence surrounding
210

See generally SEDONA FRAMEWORK, supra note 2 at 10 (giving an example of how the
location of a server can hinder the discovery process and how the law must be adopted to
deal with such issues).

211

See id. at 18.

212

Cf. Karen McVeigh and Amelia Hill, Bill Limiting Sharia Law is Motivated by
‘Concern for Muslim Women,’ THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk
/law/2011/jun/08/sharia-bill-lords-muslim-women (The practice under Sharia law of
ascribing testimony from a female witness half the weight of that from a man, for
example, could ultimately have some impact on gathering testimony from such a witness
for use in a U.S. Court.).
213

See U.S. Info. Sys. Inc. v. Int’l Bhd., No. 00 Civ 4763 RMB JCF, 2006 WL 2136249
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) (highlighting that under some circumstances, the mere fact
that documents were produced pursuant to discovery or a subpoena is sufficient for
authentication).
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e-mail early in the litigation to help support authenticity in the context of
foreign e-mail.
Such evidence may include descriptions of
contemporaneous events and opinions, references to certain circumstances
specifically known by the sender, a time stamp prior to litigation,214
certain unique uses of language, or circumstantial evidence associated
with whether e-mail services are provided through an ISP, an employer, or
via a web-based service (i.e., web-based services will have a unique URL
that can go towards authentication; evidence of the authentication and
access controls used to secure an employer-provided e-mail system may
be used to address concerns regarding hacking or fraudulent use).215
B.

Text Messages, Instant Messages, and
Electronic Chat Logs

[63] Text messages, instant messages, and electronic chat logs present
the same types of challenges to authenticity as e-mail; namely that anyone
with access to the sending device could feasibly author a particular
message and that—as with e-mail—“while an electronic message can be
traced to a particular computer, it can rarely be connected to a specific
author with any certainty.”216 However, counsel can overcome these
challenges, and the purported text, instant message or electronic chat log
can be authenticated in the same manner as any other document: through
the introduction of evidence that the text, instant message or chat log is
what the proponent says.217 This authenticating evidence can take the
214

See id. at *6.

215

See generally Lorraine 241 F.R.D. at 551-52 (discussing how employer company email can help identify the source of the e-mail).
216

In re F.P., 878 A.2d 92, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (quoting appellant’s argument).

217

Id. at 96 (“We see no justification for constructing unique rules for admissibility of
electronic communications such as instant messages; they are to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis as any other document to determine whether or not there has been
an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and authenticity.”).
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form of testimony from a witness who participated in the
communication,218 expert testimony or comparison with a previously
authenticated message, or evidence of distinctive characteristics and
corroborating circumstances. Counsel must remain cognizant, though, of
language translation issues, as discussed supra.
[64] The testimony of any participant in the conversation can
authenticate a text, message, or chat log, thereby evening the playing field
for practitioners who may not be able to access foreign participants’ live
testimony. Thus, a text message can be authenticated even in situations
where the witness did not print out or save the message219 or there is no
testimony from an Internet Service Provider or other expert.220

218

See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a sex
crimes conviction by finding that chat log transcripts were properly authenticated through
testimony from a woman posing as a minor child who participated in online chats with
the ddefendant, and that the transcripts fully and fairly reproduced the chats between her
and the ddefendant). The Barlow Court went on to note that the issue of authenticating
online chat log transcripts through testimony of the other participant had been addressed
previously. But see United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding
sufficient authentication from testimony by a federal agent and a federal informant who
engaged in the chat in question); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 629, 630-31 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding the testimony of another chat room user that he recorded the chats and
printed them out, and that the printouts appeared to accurately represent the chats, was
sufficient to establish prima facie showing of authenticity); United States v. Simpson, 152
F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a combination of identifying information
given by the user in the chat and corroborating evidence found in defendant's home near
his computer was sufficient to authenticate the chat log).
219

People v. Pierre, 41 A.D.3d 290, 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that an instant
message was properly authenticated through testimony from defendant’s close friend that
the screen name associated with the message was the defendant’s, that the witness sent a
message to that screen name and received a reply, and that the content of the message
would have only made sense if it was sent by defendant).

220

In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94-95.

53

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

C.

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

Website Content and Archived Web Pages

[65] The judiciary has typically viewed the Internet—arguably the most
revolutionary communications development of modern times and giving
rise to an unprecedented level of global interaction—in a dubious light due
to its public access and the ease by which content can be manipulated,
even prompting one court to opine that “any evidence procured off the
Internet is adequate for almost nothing.”221 At first glance, this skepticism
seems valid when one looks at examples such as Wikipedia.com, a multilingual, free encyclopedia with the tag line “the free encyclopedia that
anyone can edit.”222 However, Wikipedia serves as an excellent
microcosm for the lack of uniformity with which the judiciary approaches
the Internet in general. At least one state court has specifically called
Wikipedia “a malleable source of information [that] is inherently
unreliable,”223 but other courts at the federal level have been skeptics of
this position.224 Wikipedia does not make any guarantee of validity with
221

St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999);
see supra note 196.

222

WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).

223

Palisades Collection, L.L.C. v. Graubard, No. A-1338-07T3, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1025, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 17, 2009) (reversing the trial court’s
decision after finding that the court erred in admitting a print out from Wikipedia and
taking judicial notice of content from the Wikipedia page). In support of its holding, the
court stated that the “trial court's acceptance of Wikipedia was also contrary to the
principle that judicial notice must be based upon ‘sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned.’” Id.
224

E.g. Verkuilen v. MediaBank, LLC, 646 F.3d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing to
Wikipedia for background information on “Media Buying”); Alfa Corp. v. OAO Alfa
Bank, 475 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361-62, No. 04 Cv 8968 (KMW) (JCF), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12771, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting the argument that expert
testimony should be excluded because the expert relied, in part, on a Wikipedia page);
see also Chapman v. San Francisco Newspaper Agency, No. C01-02305 CRB, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18012, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2002) (finding that a computer printout of
page from U.S. Postal Service Web site was sufficiently reliable to constitute an
admissible public record).
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regard to content and disclaims any liability, telling users to post and
utilize information at their own risk.225 In this sense, Wikipedia reflects a
concern highlighted by Judge Grimm, that a website may display
information not posted by or officially endorsed by the site owner.226
[66] As with all electronic evidence, the court, in authenticating a web
page, must find enough support that would “warrant a reasonable person
in determining that the evidence is what it purports to be,”227 and can do
so through witness testimony, expert opinion, public records evidence
supporting F.R.E. 901(7), process or system evidence supporting F.R.E.
901(9), or evidence deemed to be self-authenticating as an official
publication under F.R.E. 902(5). In Lorraine, Judge Grimm suggests
additional factors that counsel should consider when authenticating
content from web pages, including length of time that the data was on the
site and whether the owner of the data has republished it elsewhere.228
[67] The Internet gives counsel involved in cross-border matters a
unique ability to gather information otherwise difficult to retrieve.
Information about foreign business, individuals, government entities, and
other organizations is often readily available from any U.S.-based office
with an Internet browser.229 While some courts have deemed website

225

Wikipedia: General Disclaimer, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Feb. 9, 2012),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:General_disclaimer (“…all information read here
is without any implied warranty of fitness for any purpose or use whatsoever.”).
226

Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007).

227

United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158, No. 1:09-cr-00024-JAW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4721, at *11 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing United States v. Holmquist,
36 F.3d 154, 167 (1st Cir. 1994)).
228

Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 555-56 (internal citations omitted).

229

See
How
to
Track
Down
Anyone
Online,
LIFE
HACKER,
http://lifehacker.com/329033/how-to-track-down-anyone-online (last visited Feb. 10,
2012) (explaining how Internet users can easily search for people using the various
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content authenticated simply because the offered printout contains the
website URL and the date of printing,230 counsel should use caution in
relying on this method in cross-border matters. Instead counsel should
“present evidence from a witness with personal knowledge of the website .
. . stating that the printout accurately reflects the content of the website
and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was
made.”231 The individual performing the actual search and review, if
available, may serve as an ideal source of testimony. Counsel can help
support authentication by obtaining the testimony of an expert well-versed
in the use of hash values,232 who can speak the language displayed on the
target website, collect web postings and other such content, and provide

services and search engines available online); LEXISNEXIS INFO PRO,
http://law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/zimmermans/disp.aspx?z=1313 (last visited Feb. 10,
2012) (listing online resources for finding information about companies); Tax
Information for Government Entities, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/govt/index.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2012) (providing links to tax information about federal, state, and local
government agencies).
230

U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 031605, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20753, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004).
231

Toytrackerz, LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74484, at
*24 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2009); see also Nightlight Sys., Inc. v. Nitelites Franchise Sys.,
Inc., No. 1:04-CV-2112-CAP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95538, at *16 (N.D. Ga. May
11, 2007) (“In addition to a witness with personal knowledge of the web page at issue,
to authenticate a printout from a web page, the proponent must present evidence from
a percipient witness stating that the printout accurately reflects the content of the page
and the image of the page on the computer at which the printout was made.”).
232

As a practical strategy to support authentication, counsel should use hash values
whenever possible. A hash is defined as “a mathematical algorithm that represents a
unique value for a given set of data, similar to a digital fingerprint.” THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 25 (Sherry B.
Harris ed., 3rd ed. 2010), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?
did=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf; see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547 (“Hash values can be
inserted into original electronic documents when they are created to provide them with
distinctive characteristics that will permit their authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).”).
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testimony or prepare an affidavit or declaration describing how and when
these efforts were performed.
[68] U.S. Courts have differed in the level of inquiry used to
authenticate evidence collected from the Internet Archive.233 In Telewizja
Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the defendant adequately
authenticated printouts from the Internet Archive by submitting a
declaration from a representative of the Internet Archive, who stated that
the copies retrieved came from the website as it appeared on the dates in
question.234 The court went on to note that the party opposing the
printouts presented no evidence of the Internet Archive’s unreliability or
that the exhibits themselves were untrustworthy.235
[69] In granting a Canadian defendant’s motion to strike various
printouts from the Wayback Machine,236 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York relied, in part, on the absence of the type of
personal knowledge present in Telewizja. The court noted that the
plaintiff lacked personal knowledge about how the web content appeared
at the earlier time and did not proffer testimony or sworn statements from
233

See generally Deborah R. Eltgroth, Best Evidence and the Wayback Machine: Toward
a Workable Authentication Standard for Archived Internet Evidence, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 182 (2009) (discussing differing judicial opinions and orders that have commented
on the admissibility of Internet Archive evidence).
234

Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2004 WL
2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004).

235

Id.

236

The Wayback Machine is a free service offered by the Internet Archive, a non-profit
organization formed for the purpose of provided access to “historical collections that
exist in digital format.”
About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE,
http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). The Wayback
Machine allows users to search for and retrieve archived versions of web sites. The
Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php#The_
Wayback_Machine (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
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any employees from the companies hosting the sites from which the pages
were printed.237 Taken together, these two opinions show the importance
of having an appropriately qualified person perform the archive collection,
consider any translation issues, and provide oral or written testimony as to
the archived copies’ appearance in comparison to the website as it
appeared at the time in question.238
D.

Social Media

[70] Social media and social networking sites have facilitated an
unprecedented amount of interconnectivity among citizens from various
nations.239 On Facebook alone, for example, there are more than 800
million active users; of those users, approximately 80% of them live
outside the U.S.240 The micro-blogging site Twitter is very popular all
over the world, with some statistics indicating that users across the world

237

Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No. 06CV1909(JFB)(ARL), 2007 WL 922306, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007).

238

As a practical consideration, counsel should also be aware of the technological
limitations of collecting archived web site content, including the fact that an archived
page may not include all the content as it originally appeared since content may have
since been deleted, may require communication with another host for certain content, or
may contain broken or re-directed links. When dealing with evidence collected from the
Internet Archive, counsel would be wise to consider a forensic or other expert that can
provide testimony regarding these issues.
239

See About - Twitter, http://twitter.com/about#about (last visited Feb. 4, 2012)
(indicating that Twitter is “used by people in nearly every country in the world”);
Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.
aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (highlighting that “Facebook’s mission
is to make the world more open and connected.”).
240

Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/defa
ult.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
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send over 1 billion “tweets” each week.241 Although Facebook and
Twitter are the poster children for the explosion in the use of online social
networks, millions of users subscribe to a multitude of different social
media sites.242 The international market for social media is extremely
robust, with many local sites dominating larger social media outlets, like
Facebook, in their respective regions and offering competitive alternatives
to U.S.-based social media and networking sites.243 For example, StudiVZ
is the largest social network in Germany;244 Xing is a competitor to
LinkedIn that is popular in Spain, France, and Italy;245 and in China,
where Facebook is blocked by government censors, networks like QZone,
RenRen, and Pengyou compete for users.246
[71] A few years ago, social media and networking sites would not have
registered on the average practitioner’s radar.247 However, potential

241

Anna Gervai, Twitter Statistics - Updated stats for 2011, MARKETING GUM,
http://www.marketinggum.com/twitter-statistics-2011-updated-stats (last visited Feb. 4,
2012).
242

See Facebook Newsroom - Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/c
ontent/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (highlighting that, on
Facebook alone, more than 50% of users log on to the site every day).
243

See Sarov Jain, 40 Most Popular Social Networking Sites of the World,
http://socialmediatoday.com/soravjain/195917/40-most-popularsocial-networking-sites-world (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
SOCIALMEDIATODAY,

244

Id.

245

Id.

246

Kai Lukoff, Coming Soon: Tencent’s “International” Social Network, TECHRICE,
http://techrice.com/2011/01/17/coming-soon-tencents-international-social-network/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2012).
247
See Evan E. North, Comment, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of
Social Networking Websites, 58 KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2010).
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evidence from such sites must be preserved if relevant,248 and at least one
U.S. Court has now held that counsel’s failure to investigate and introduce
evidence from such social networking sites could constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.249 Social media falls within the purview of F.R.C.P.
26 and it, too, must jump through the hoops of admissibility.250 The
unique challenges that practitioners face when admitting electronic
information into evidence become very apparent when social media is at
issue, particularly where the site is hosted outside the U.S.251
[72] Despite social media and networking sites falling under the same
traditional admissibility rubric as all electronic documents and data, social
media evidence has occasionally engendered heightened judicial
skepticism due to concerns about susceptibility of social media and
networking sites to fraud.252 In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of
248

See Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85212, at *11
(D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011) (describing how defendant spoliated evidence, albeit
unintentionally, in changing his Facebook profile picture while litigation was pending).
249

See Cannedy v. Adams, No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958, at *280-29
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009). The court deemed counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to investigate an Internet posting via an AOL Instant Messenger “Buddy” profile
purporting to be the victim’s recantation of allegations that the Petitioner had molested
her. Id.

250

See Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on
Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366, 369
(2010).
251

See David J. Goldstone & Daniel B. Reagan, Social Networking, Mobile Devices, and
the Cloud: The Newest Frontiers of Privacy Law, 55 B.B.J. 17 (2011) (presenting recent
developments in using social media as evidence).
252

See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that website
postings on a white supremacist’s site were ruled unauthenticated where proponent could
not show that they were posted by the actual group maintaining the site as opposed to the
proponent herself, who was knowledgeable in the use of computers); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010) (ruling MySpace messages unauthenticated
because proponent did not offer evidence of others who had access to the page and who
could have authored the messages); People v. Lenihan, 30 Misc. 3d 289, 911 N.Y.S. 2d
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Appeals reversed and remanded the matter of the defendant’s conviction
based on the State’s failure to properly authenticate printouts taken from a
MySpace profile that contained threatening statements allegedly made by
the Petitioner’s girlfriend directed towards the State’s witness.253 The
State attempted to authenticate printouts by using the lead investigator’s
testimony that he knew it was the Petitioner’s girlfriend’s profile because
it contained a photograph of her and the Petitioner, her birth date,
references to the Petitioner, and other details.254 The State never
questioned the Petitioner’s girlfriend about the subject profile.255 In
holding that the MySpace printouts were not properly authenticated, the
Griffin Court highlighted the fact that social networking sites can mask the
true end-user,256 and that the factors highlighted by the State did not
constitute sufficient distinctive characteristics257 because of the possibility

588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding that photographs taken from a MySpace profile could
not be authenticated because they could be edited using certain computer software).
253

Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 347-48 (Md. 2011).

254

Id. at 348. The MySpace profile also contained the message: “FREE BOOZY!!!!
JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!” Id.
“Boozy” was the alleged nickname of the ddefendant and the following comment was
argued to be consisted with threats the Petitioner’s girlfriend allegedly made to a witness.
Id.
255

Id.

256

Id. at 353-54 (citing Samantha A. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding
to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542–43 (2009))
(highlighting Sophos, a Boston-based Internet security company, that created a profile for
a toy frog named “Freddie Staur,” and nearly 200 Facebook users chose to add the frog as
a friend”); Id. at 354 (citing United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (D.C.D. Cal 2009))
(discussing the case in which a girl committed suicide after being harassed by Lori Drew,
the mother of a former friend of her daughter’s, using a fictitious MySpace profile).
257

Id. at 357-58. The ability of a proponent of evidence to support authentication using
“distinctive characteristics” under Maryland Rule 5-901 mirrors that of the Federal Rules
of Evidence 901(b)(4). Id. at 355-56.
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for fraud.258 The Griffin court went on to suggest methods which counsel
could use to properly authenticate printouts from social media sites,
including:
(1) gathering deposition testimony from the alleged owner of the
subject profile about whether they created the profile and
posted the content at issue,
(2) investigating any subject hardware to uncover any evidentiary
link between such devices and the profile and/or any online
content, and
(3) contact service providers directly to gather user-account and
profile information.259
[73] The Appellate Court of Connecticut further echoed the Griffin
Court’s concerns regarding the potential for fraud in the world of social
media in State v. Eleck.260 The Petitioner in Eleck argued that the trial
court’s refusal to admit a message, allegedly sent by a prosecution witness
that he printed from his Facebook account, was an abuse of discretion.261
Defense counsel attempted to use the Facebook message to contradict
testimony from a State’s witness that she did not communicate with the
Petitioner following a stabbing.262 In response to the State’s objection to
258

Id. at 352 (citing Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave
New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.16 (2010))
(highlighting that the “identity of who generated the profile may be confound[ed],
because ‘a person observing the online profile of a user with whom the observer is
unacquainted has no idea whether the profile is legitimate’”). But see id. at 367 (Harrell,
J., dissenting) (“The technological heebie-jeebies discussed in the Majority Opinion go,
in my opinion, however, not to the admissibility of the print-outs under Rule 5-901, but
rather to the weight to be given the evidence by the trier of fact.”).
259

See Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64.

260

State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).

261

Id. at 820.

262

Id.
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the Facebook printout, the defense attempted to authenticate the document
through testimony from the Petitioner: (1) that he printed the message
from his personal computer; (2) that he recognized the witness’ profile
name; (3) that the profile contained photographs identifying the witness as
the profile owner; (4) and that the witness had deleted the Petitioner as a
friend the day after her testimony in court.263 The witness admitted that
the messages came from her account but denied authorship and testified
that her account had been “hacked.”264 Although the court gave the
hacking claims little weight, the court stated that such testimony highlights
the security concerns with social media and supported the notion that,
although the messages came from the witness’ Facebook account, this did
not conclude that the messages came from the witness herself.265 The
Court upheld the conviction, in part, on the grounds that the Facebook
printout had not been properly authenticated.266
[74]
Despite the anonymity offered by social networking sites that may
support concerns about fraud, some courts have held that the ease of
altering electronic communications should not be the sole basis for their
exclusion as unauthenticated.267 Social media presents many of the same
263

Id. at 820-21.

264

Id. at 820.

265

Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822. (citing Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172 (Mass. 2010)).

266

Id. at 825. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the Facebook
messages could be authenticated using the “reply letter” doctrine, which states that “letter
B is authenticated merely by reference to its content and circumstances suggesting it was
in reply to earlier letter A and sent by addressee of letter A . . . .” CONN. CODE EVID. § 91 (a), commentary (4). The Eleck court held that there were no circumstances which tied
the reply message to the alleged sender and the fact that a message was sent and a reply
received does not, by itself, authenticate the reply. Eleck, 23 A.3d at 825.
267

See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006); Simon v. State,
632 S.E.2d 723, 726 (Ga. 2006); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 381 (Mass.
2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172-73 (Mass. 2010).
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challenges as paper records. In the same manner that a profile on
Facebook may allow a user to hijack another’s identity, “[a] signature can
be forged, a letter can be typed on another’s typewriter; distinct letter head
stationary can be copied or stolen.”268 In determining how to verify an
author’s identity, practitioners need look no further than the current
rules.269
[75] Though both Griffin and Eleck highlighted the potential for fraud
in their rulings, deeming certain social media evidence inadmissible, the
important lesson learned from these opinions is that a proponent of foreign
social media evidence should potentially offer more than just a profile
name, photograph, and a few statements about a party to lay a proper
foundation. The Eleck court noted that practitioners attempting to
authenticate social media evidence can do so using traditional methods
such as obtaining “direct testimony of the purported author or
circumstantial evidence of ‘distinctive characteristics’ in the document
that identify the author.”270 In these situations, a party must turn to other
foundational support. As can be extrapolated from Griffin, counsel could
build such support through obtaining hardware or devices where posts
may have originated for evidence to support distinctive characteristics,
collecting affidavits from service providers describing any unique
functionality of a social media site that may provide some indicia of

268

Eleck, 23 A.3d at 823 (citing In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).

269

Id.; see also JOHN BROWNING, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING:
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA’S IMPACT ON THE LAW (Aspatore 2010) at 111
(highlighting the reluctance that courts have shown in crafting rules specifically
applicable to the authentication of electronic data).
270

Eleck, 23 A.3d at 823. Examples of distinctive characteristics and corroborating
circumstances that support authentication include a message sent from a known sender’s
e-mail address including factual details known to the sender corroborated by a phone call,
an author of chat room messages showing up at an arranged meeting, instant messages
authenticated by author’s reference to his own name, surrounding circumstances, and
threats corroborated by later actions. Id. at 824-25.
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authenticity, or gathering testimony from other witnesses who may have
personal knowledge of a target profile.271
[76] When counsel cannot obtain direct testimony, the process of
authentication becomes a very fact based inquiry with the proponent
gathering evidence of “distinctive characteristics” for the court to evaluate
considering “all the circumstances.”272 When relying on circumstantial
evidence to authenticate social media evidence, counsel must do her due
diligence to investigate the media and hardware involved, the applications
used to generate content and the indicia of reliability in the content itself.
At least one U.S. Magistrate Judge, with regard to downloaded documents
generally, stated he “would expect the proponent of downloaded
document[s] to provide, at a minimum, the web address and path where
the document was located, the date and title of the document, the date the
document was accessed/downloaded, and a sworn statement that the
content of the copy submitted to the court was not altered from the content
appearing on the website.”273 The circumstances surrounding the creation
and/or delivery of a piece of social media evidence can go a long way
towards meeting the authentication burden. Additional circumstantial
evidence to support authorship could include (i) expert testimony
regarding the security controls of a particular website274 as well as the
271

Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 364-65 (Md. 2011).

272

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).

273

State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 2003 Ohio 6560, 24 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 9, 2003). Magistrate Judge Lazarus went on to note that “although the legal
requirements for admissibility of downloaded documents may not be well established, a
party's statement that ‘I downloaded these pages from the internet’ is probably not
sufficient to authenticate a downloaded document.” Id.; see BROWNING, supra note 269
at 113 (suggesting that evidence showing that a purported web page author actually wrote
the content could take the form of “…an admission by the author, a stipulation entered
into by the parties, the testimony of a witness who assisted in or observed the creation of
the web page, or content on the web page itself that connects it to the author.”).

274

Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172-73 (Mass. 2010).
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relative ease or difficulty with which the site could be hacked (particularly
critical in the case of non-U.S. or non-E.U. social media, where security
controls may be lax),275 (ii) content of the message itself or any
attachments (i.e. photographs of the purported author, descriptions of
unique circumstances known only to the sender and the recipient such as
nicknames or shared experiences, indications that the message or post
shows an awareness of certain facts in issue),276 and (iii) similar
275

Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 381-82 (Mass. 2011). The court found
adequate “confirming circumstances” to authenticate e-mails of a defendant where the emails originated from an account bearing the defendant's name which the defendant
acknowledged he used, and the e-mails were found on the hard drive of the computer that
the defendant acknowledged he owned, and to which he supplied all necessary
passwords. Id. The court went on to say that this was sufficient evidence to authenticate
the e-mails absent persuasive evidence of fraud, tampering, or "hacking." Id. Although
the court further held that “the defendant's uncorroborated testimony that others used his
computer regularly and that he did not author the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not
the admissibility, of these messages” it nevertheless behooves counsel objecting to the
admissibility of certain electronic evidence by arguing fraudulent authorship to present
expert testimony on the ability to hack a particular website as well as other circumstances
that may support fraud. Id.; see People v. Pierre, 41 A.D.3d 289, 291 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007) (in holding that an instant message was properly authenticated through
circumstantial evidence the court noted that “there was no evidence that anyone had a
motive, or opportunity, to impersonate defendant using his screen name.”). The court in
Purdy went on to find that the defendant's uncorroborated testimony that others used his
computer regularly and that he did not author the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not
the admissibility, of these messages. Purdy at 382. (citing to Com. v. Mahoney, 510
N.E.2d 759, 762 (Mass. 1987); Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 187 N.E.2d
135, 137 (Mass. 1963).); The court goes on to state, “Evidence of authorship would not
necessarily have been a precondition of admissibility if the prosecution had offered the emails, which the defendant acknowledged having read, as evidence of the defendant's
knowledge of the nature of the massage business in the salon. If offered for this purpose,
the prosecution would not need to show authorship of the e-mails, but would need only to
authenticate the communications as accurate reproductions of the messages that were
received and sent from the defendant's computer and e-mail address.”) (internal citations
omitted).

276

In Tienda v. State, 05-09-00553-CR, 2010 WL 5129722 (Tex. App. Dec. 17, 2010),
petition for discretionary review granted (May 4, 2011), aff'd, PD-0312-11, 2012 WL
385381 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2012). The Texas Court of Appeals, Fifth District,
upheld a murder conviction after finding that the trial court did not err in admitting
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characteristics between unauthenticated messages or online content and
those definitively authored by the party in question.277
[77] Counsel can help establish the reliability of certain online
communications and content by giving “due attention to the nature of the
site at the time relevant to the case.”278 This is particularly germane to
certain evidence taken from MySpace. The appellant argued that there was no proof that
the MySpace pages were owned and maintained by him. However, at trial the court
introduced evidence that the profile owner identified himself as “Smiley” or “Ron
Tienda” from “Dallas” or “D-town” as well as photos of the appellant, references to the
murder of the complainant, and comments mentioning the arrest of the appellant, his
electronic monitoring device, the fact that multiple parties were involved in the shooting,
and individuals that gave statements to the police the night of the murder. The Tienda
court noted that “the inherent nature of social networking websites encourages members
who choose to use pseudonyms to identify themselves by posting profile pictures or
descriptions of their physical appearances, personal backgrounds, and lifestyle. This type
of individualization is significant in authenticating a particular profile page as having
been created by the person depicted in it.”
277

United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that subject
e-mails can be authenticated through comparison to other e-mails that have been
authenticated).
278

State v. Altajir, 33 A.3d 193, 197 (Conn. 2012). In this matter, the defendant received
a partially suspended prison sentence and probation following her plea of nolo
contendere after she caused the death of an individual during an auto-accident. She
appealed the Connecticut Appellate Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s decision to
revoke her probation, arguing that her right to due process was violated when the court
admitted undated Facebook photos which influenced the sentencing decision. In its
affirmation of the Appellate Court’s decision, the court stated in a footnote that “due to
the dynamic nature of Facebook and other such social network sites, these details, as well
as basic structural features of the social network, are subject to frequent modification.
Care should therefore be taken to assess information relating to social network sites on a
case-by-case basis, with due attention to the nature of the site at the time relevant to the
case.” In its discussion about where twenty-four of the thirty-six images were located on
Facebook (i.e. “posted by other Facebook users to their own profiles”), the Court
discussed certain functionality that Facebook allowed at the time of sentencing (i.e. users
could “untag” photographs to disassociate them from their personal profile, but a user
could not delete images from another profile, the user of which had originally posted the
subject photo). It is important to note that the Court stated, “the evidence of reliability
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non-U.S. social media sites that may provide different features, layouts,
and have developed differently over time. For example, Renren provides
an instant messaging service (iRénrénzhuōmiàn or 人人桌面) allegedly
more popular than that of Facebook, which U.S. counsel should take into
account when collecting evidence to support authentication of Renren
pages.279 The fact that Renren was apparently hacked on April 29, 2011
illustrates how the history of a social media site could impact admitting or
objecting to evidence.280 Counsel could use this knowledge to challenge
the authentication of affected profiles on that date or afterwards. The
German site StudiVZ offers users the ability to track who most recently
visited their profile, a feature that many attorneys familiar with Facebook
may not consider.281 Knowledge of such functionality, as well as
language and cultural differences (i.e., social media and non-U.S. text
slang) could help counsel uncover additional distinctive characteristics or
proffered by the state here is, at best, limited, and certainly would not be sufficient under
the rules of evidence at a trial” when, in submitting that the pictures in question were of
the defendant while she was on probation, the State represented that the defendant’s hair
was darker after she was released from prison, consistent with the Facebook photos, and
offered proof of the upload dates of the photos, all of which went unchallenged by the
defendant. See also A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 2008). In a juvenile
delinquency adjudication proceeding, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in reversing the
judgment of the trial court, noted in dicta that “the evidence presented at the fact-finding
hearing was extremely sparse, uncertain, and equivocal regarding the operation and use
of My Space.com (“MySpace”), which is central to this case.” Id. The Court provided
information regarding the “use and operation of MySpace” to “facilitate understanding of
the facts and application of relevant legal principles. Id.
279

Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Xiaonei/106216539417805
(last visited Feb. 4, 2012). (Ironically posted using a Facebook page).

280

Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renren#Privacy_Leakage_
April_2011. Subsequent to the attack, all Chinese media coverage of the event were
removed. Screenshots of some of the sources survive, with text in the original Chinese.
See http://pastebin.com/qKrbvGFF; http://page.renren.com/699131345/note/724338594;
http://i.imgur.com/NCUi5.png; http://i.imgur.com/4r3FN.png.
281

Facebook does not offer this functionality.
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circumstances necessary to authenticate evidence collected from a foreign
social media or networking site.282
E.

Internet Tracking Information

[78] One of the unique benefits that law enforcement and legal
practitioners have in the Information Age is the ability to track online
activity through browser caches283 and “cookies.”284 Internet browsing
history has played a significant role in a number of recent cases.285
282

For example, certain sites are not available in English (i.e. RenRen & Qzone); thus,
their review will require the use of an experienced translator.

283

“Caching” is a generic term meaning “to store.” In the context of online activity,
“caching” refers to the temporary storage of information for later use. Browser caches
are locations where data about websites that a user has previously visited is stored.
Instead of a request being serviced by an online web server, information is retrieved from
the browser cache allowing for information to be retrieved more quickly. See Nat'l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 999-1000 (2005)
(“Cacheing [sic] obviates the need for the end user to download new information from
third-party Web sites each time the consumer attempts to access them, thereby increasing
the speed of information retrieval.”). A browser cache is also commonly referred to as
the “Temporary Internet Files Folder.”

284

“Cookies” are messages given to web browsers by web servers that are stored locally
in a text file format. Cookies are used to track users’ browsing activity. See Blumofe v.
Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.), 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. Mass.
2003) (citing M. Enzer, Glossary of Internet Terms, MATISEE.NET,
http://www.matisse.net/files/glossary (last visited Feb, 4, 2012)).
285

In the quadruple-murder trial of a Montreal couple and their eldest son (dubbed by
many in the press as the “Shafia Family Murder”), a police officer testified on October
27, 2011 that searches for “documentaries on murders” and “where to commit a murder”
were found on the laptop used by one of the defendants. Timeline: the Shafia family
murder trial, GLOBAL NEWS AND THE GAZETTE (Feb. 9, 2012, 8:23 AM),
http://www.globalnews.ca/timeline+shafia+murder+trial/6442509727/story.html.
Similarly, in the Casey Anthony murder trial, which caused a media frenzy in the U.S. in
2011, the prosecution offered testimony from technical experts regarding the internet
browsing history of the defendant including online searches using terms such as
“chloroform,” “neck breaking,” “inhalation,” “head injury” and “making weapons out of
household products.” Jones, Keith J., Casey Anthony Murder Trial, The Computer
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Although browser caches and cookies are technologically distinct, from an
evidentiary standpoint, they provide many of the same benefits and pose
similar challenges. While there is some support for the notion that certain
categories of data, including temporary Internet files, search history,
caches files, and cookies are “generally not discoverable in most cases,”286
it is important to note that the duty to preserve such data may still apply
under certain circumstances,287 especially where the proponent of such
information can show “good cause.”288 Such evidence can also be
Evidence
Part
#2,
JDA
BLOG
(June
http://www.jonesdykstra.com/blog/201-caseyanthony-part2.

14,

2011,

12:00),

286

SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM 14 (Oct. 1, 2009). (“The following categories of ESI
generally are not discoverable in most cases, and if any party intends to request the
preservation or production of these categories, then that intention should be discussed at
the meet and confer or as soon thereafter as practicable… (2) random access memory
(RAM) or other ephemeral data; (3) on-line access data such as temporary internet files,
history, cache, cookies, etc.”).
287

Victory Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 524 (D. Md. 2010)
(holding that “[t]he general duty to preserve may also include deleted data, data in slack
spaces, backup tapes, legacy systems, and metadata.”) (quoting Paul W. Grimm et. al.,
Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U.
BALT. L. REV. 381, 410 (2008)); see Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093
FMC-JCx, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96360, at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007). In a
copyright infringement case filed by several motion pictures studios against the operators
of a website with servers located in the Netherlands, the court found that data stored in
defendants’ website’s random access memory (RAM) was extremely relevant and
ordered that it be preserved. Id.
288

Tener v. Cremer, 89 A.D.3d 75, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). In this defamation action,
the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department reversed an order
of the New York Supreme Court denying appellant’s civil contempt motion against a
non-party for failing to turn over the identities of all persons who accessed the internet at
a specific time based on the grounds of technological impracticality. Id. The court held
that the appellant had shown “good cause” for requesting the cache file potentially
present in unallocated space on the target hard drive since the “only chance to confirm
the identity of the person who allegedly defamed her may lie with [the non-party in
possession of the data].” Id. The court remanded the matter to the trial court for a
hearing to determine whether the data is in fact “inaccessible.” Id.
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discoverable by providing foundational support for other admissible
evidence (i.e., internet cookies may be used to show a nexus between a
user and a specific social media site). As with social media evidence,
there is a concern that such Internet tracking information can be hacked,
manipulated, or, absent additional information, serve as a dubious
indicator of the identity of the actual user.289 This “modification”
argument, although a very common one, usually does not, absent more
specific allegations, provide a basis upon which a court will deem cookies
and other such data inadmissible.290 In affirming the conviction of a
defendant on various sexual abuse crimes, the Court of Appeals in Utah
held that a list of Internet cookies that contained site names suggesting
pornographic content was properly authenticated where the party who
created the list gave testimony about the operation and regular use of her
computer, demonstrated a sophisticated knowledge of the interaction
between her computer and the Internet, and testified that the defendant

289

See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006). The court
noted that the possibility of alteration is not limited to e-mail and:
can be true of any piece of documentary evidence, such as a letter, a
contract or an invoice. . . . The possibility of alteration does not and
cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as unidentified or
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the
rationale for excluding paper documents . . . . The defendant is free to
raise this issue with the jury and put on evidence that e-mails are
capable of being altered before they are passed on.
Id.; see also United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming
admission of computer records where allegation of tampering was “…almost wildeyed speculation . . . [without] evidence to support such a scenario.”); United States v.
Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The existence of an air-tight security
system [to prevent tampering] is not, however, a prerequisite to the admissibility of
computer printouts. If such a prerequisite did exist, it would become virtually
impossible to admit computer-generated records.”).
290

Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
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would have had access to her computer, that she personally viewed many
of the subject sites, and that she created the list of cookies herself.291
[79] The proponent of such evidence collected from foreign sources
faces the same dilemma as with social media or other ESI evidence
collected domestically and can take further guidance from Griffin:
(1) Is there a credible source of testimony to authenticate such
evidence from the host country?
(2) Can one acquire the devices in question to further investigate
such Internet tracking information?
(3) Can one gather the information necessary to authenticate such
browsing history and other such data (i.e. subpoenaing Google
to obtain the IP addresses and user names to ultimately link
certain online activity to certain people or devices or
subpoenaing Internet Service Providers to link IP address to
specific ISP customers, where such subpoenas are permissible
pursuant to applicable law)?292
(4) What do Internet browsing history and other cookie data
actually prove?293
[80] Just as the Griffin and Eleck courts highlighted the fact that
although a social media printout or display will readily show only that
someone posted a particular piece of content and not necessarily who
posted it, internet tracking information will show only that someone
visited a site, but the who can only be uncovered through the same type of
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State v. Burke 256 P.3d 1102, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 2011).
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In a defamation lawsuit filed in California, counsel for a Turkish developer
subpoenaed Google for user information and IP address log-in history. Kinay v. TCI
Journal, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW JOURNAL (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.citmedialan
w.org/threats/kinay-v-tci-journal (case pending in California state court).
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See supra note 284.
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analysis of distinctive characteristics and corroborating circumstances as
other ESI.294
F.

An International Case Study

[81] Where testimony from foreign sources is unavailable, distinctive
characteristics and other corroborating circumstantial evidence must
authenticate foreign ESI. The following case study illuminates these
issues. In a 2009 criminal conspiracy case, United States v. Albert
Gonzalez, three men were indicted on various charges involving the online
theft of credit card numbers.295 The government submitted two pieces of
evidence: a computer server where the defendant allegedly stored hacking
programs and stolen credit card numbers and files from a laptop seized
during the arrest of a co-defendant.296 The evidence was collected with
the help of the state police of Latvia and Turkey.297 The government
submitted Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty requests for the foreign
nationals who assisted in the acquisition of the evidence to provide
testimony but uncertainty existed over the ability to secure such
evidence.298 Regardless, the government submitted that such testimony
294

See generally Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. 2010), cert. granted, 415 Md. 607
(Md. 2010), rev'd, 419 Md. 343 (Md. 2011).
295

Government’s Motion in limine at 2, United States v. Albert Gonzalez, Crim. Docket
No. 2:08-cr-00160-SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf.
296

Id. (The Government generated forensic images for the both the Latvian server and the
seized laptop for evidentiary purposes.).
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Id. at 3-7; see also Kim Zetter, In Gonzalez Hacking Case, a High-Stakes Fight Over
a Ukranian’s Laptop, WIRED (Aug. 20, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatl
evel/2009/08/gonzalez-evidence/.
298

See Government’s Motion in limine at 4-7, Gonzalez, Crim. Docket No. 2:08-cr00160-SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at http://www.wired.com
/images_blogs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf.
The government
expressed this concern in a footnote to its letter brief: “The government . . . has no power
to compel foreign citizens to testify in United States court proceedings. It is uncertain at
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was not required since a foundation could be properly laid through
circumstantial evidence.299
[82] In arguing that the “distinctive characteristics” of the server, in
combination with various circumstances, provided sufficient evidence for
its authentication, the Government submitted that (i) the computer server
and the forensic image taken of the server were “substantially
identical,”300 (ii) the IP address provided by a cooperating witness was
hosted on the target server, (iii) none of the subject files were altered on
the server following the arrest of the cooperating witness and the
defendant, and (iv) the examiners were able to open files on the server
using the password provided by the cooperating witness.301
[83] The Government also submitted a forensic image of the files of the
laptop seized prior to the co-defendant’s arrest.302 The image emerged
after the co-defendant was in custody, and, furthermore, counsel showed
that: (i) no files were altered between the date of arrest and the date of
image creation, (ii) the image displayed the same “Mars” logon screen,
which was photographed on the date of arrest, (iii) the image contained
this time whether these individuals will agree to travel to the United States for trial in this
case, or even to be deposed here or in their home nations.” Id. at 1-2, n.1.
299

Id. at 9-11.

300

Id. at 4. During an arrest of an accomplice of the ddefendant, Unites States Secret
Service tracked an IP address used to mask criminal activities to a server in Riga, Latvia.
The government originally acquired a forensic image of the server, but then obtained
possession of the server itself to compare to the image. The comparison evidenced that
the server had not been altered after the defendant had been arrested. All of the files on
the server the government intended to use at trial were identical. The only difference was
that the image contained some text strings consistent with a signature or metadata created
by the device manufacturer or disk controller. Id.
301

Id. at 5.

302

Id. at 4.
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chat logs identical to those found on the defendants’ computer (seized
several months later) as well as chat logs identical to those sent from an
undercover agent’s computer to co-defendant, and (iv) the image had
several factors in common with an image made of the same laptop during
a prior search including identical chat logs, logon screen, and file
containers with the same password.303
[84] Although many circumstances make a criminal matter like
Gonzales an extreme example of authentication through distinctive
characteristics, the case provides counsel with some comfort that
circumstantial evidence can authenticate foreign ESI even if foreign
witnesses are absent or uncooperative. In Gonzalez, the government relied
heavily on evidence collected through forensic imaging and analysis of
various devices.304 Although counsel in civil cases may not have the
benefit of such devices as a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the
European Union Privacy Directives, member state implementing laws, or
national blocking statutes may prevent counsel from acquiring certain
information, this case highlights the technological means by which foreign
ESI can be collected, investigated, and distinguished for authentication
purposes.305
VI. CONCLUSION
[85] The expenditure of thousands of person-hours and, often, hundreds
of thousands of dollars, to collect evidence from around the globe can be a
very costly Sisyphean effort, if counsel does not have the knowledge and
skills to present the evidence before the finder of fact. The Rules of
Evidence apply to electronic information with the same force as they do to
303

Government’s Motion in limine at 6-7, Gonzalez, Crim. Docket No. 2:08-cr-00160SJF-AKT, Aug. 17, 2009, ECF No. 61-1, available at http://www.wired.com/images_blo
gs/threatlevel/2009/08/maksik_computer_motion.pdf.
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See generally id.
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See generally id.
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paper documents.306 The differences are in the application of those rules
to electronic evidence, which many lawyers and judges find to be
somewhat daunting.307 This problem does not have to exist, though. To
paraphrase Paul Simon, taking the admissibility of non-electronic
evidence logically by anticipating the need for fulfillment of the requisites
of the foundation for such evidence, and having documents and witnesses
ready to lay the foundation for the evidence or to challenge it,will produce
a result that can justify all the time and money spent in obtaining the
evidence.308
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See FED. R. EVID. 403; FED R. EVID 901. See generally supra Section V.
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